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ACKNOWLEDGING OUR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS:
HENRY KISSINGER AND EAST TIMOR
BRANDON MARK
[T]he odds against bringing human rights abusers to justice remain astonishingly
high. Indeed, the absence of effective means of sanctioning abuses reveals a tragic
anomaly of the post-World War II era. On the one hand, the nations of the world,
all but universally, have committed themselves to a series of detailed covenants in
which they have pledged to one another and to the larger international community
that they will respect human rights. On the other hand, far more extensive and
terrible violations of human rights have occurred than during any other period
except for World War II tself
Aryeh Neier, War Crimes
INTRODUCTION
In a one week period of March 2003, three ostensibly unrelated events
transpired that typify a central theme in United States (U.S.) foreign policy since
World War 1I. First, in early March, the inauguration of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) was heralded in The Hague. However, no representative from the
United States attended, an event described by some "as world justice's biggest step
since an international military tribunal in Nuremberg tried Nazi leaders after World
War 11.0 ' The reason no U.S. representative attended the groundbreaking event was
because the U.S. is not a party to the tribunal. In fact, the U.S. has been attempting
to undermine the tribunal by "persuading other countries to seal bilateral
agreements exempting all U.S. citizens from the court's authority 4
Clerk to Judge Daniel Friedman, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; J.D., Boalt
Hall School of Law; B.S., Weber State University. I would like to thank my parents, Russ and Donna,
whose love and support made all things possible. I would also like to thank Weston Clark, whose
encouragement made this a reality and whose insightful questions, comments, and suggestions proved
invaluable.
i. ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 253 (1998).
2. Abigail Levene, U.S. Stays Away as Global Criminal Court Gets Going, Reuters, available at
http://www.cjcj.org/press/globalcourt.html (Mar. 10, 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id. It was reported in August 2002 that the Bush administration was utilizing coercive threats
to obtain these exemptions. Citing provision of the antiterrorism laws, the Bush administration
allegedly warned foreign diplomats that their nations could lose all U.S. military assistance if they
become members of the International Criminal Court without pledging to protect Americans serving in
their countries from its reach. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Warns World Court Could Cost Aid,
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The same day the inaugural events for the ICC were being held, a U.S. federal
appeals court held that Kuwaiti, Australian, and British citizens captured in
Afghanistan in the course of the U.S. "war on terror" were not entitled to challenge
their detentions at the Guantanamo Bay naval base.5 The court held that habeas
corpus relief was unavailable to aliens held outside U.S. territory 6 On grounds that
appeared to strain logic, the court refused to grant the detainees the minimal right
to have an independent judicial body evaluate the evidence supporting their
continued incommunicado detentions. 7 The court held it lacked jurisdiction to
evaluate the merits of the detainees' claims, effectively insulating their detentions
from challenge in the judicial branch.8 However, the real effect of the ruling was to
give unlimited discretion to the president and military regarding the detention of
foreign nationals captured in foreign interventions and held on foreign U.S. bases. 9
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Aug. I1, 2002, at Al. While the administration publicly stated that
the exemptions were sought to protect American soldiers from "politically motivated charges,
privately the administration admitted the real concern is the "vulnerability of top civilian leaders to
international legal action. Elizabeth Becker, On World Court, U.S Focus Shifts to Shielding Officials,
N.Y TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A4. An unnamed senior administration official admitted, "'Henry
Kissinger, that's what they really care about."' Id. "'We always figured that the Kissinger precedent
was behind this outrageous position, but it has taken some time for the Americans to admit it, said a
senior diplomat whose country is a strong supporter of the court. Id.
5. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003); see
also James Vicim, U.S. Court Rejects Appeals by Afghan War Detamess, Reuters, available at
http://mailman.efn.org/pipermail/local activists/2003-March/002552.html (Mar. 11, 2003). But see
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding opposite of Al Odah), stay granted, 2004 U.S.
LEXIS 998 (2004).
6. Al Odah, 321 F.3d 1134.
7 The U.S. recently announced it would relent and allow few detainees to meet with defense
attorneys. Vanessa Blum, Tactics Shift in War on Terrorism, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 10, 2003, at
4. However, the Bush "administration does not back off from its position that individuals designated as
enemy combatants even those who are U.S. citizens can be held indefinitely without access to legal
counsel. Id.
8. Id. But see Gherebi, 352 F.3d 1278; Frank Davies, Guantanamo Sovereignty Issue Key to
Captives Fate, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 28, 2003, at A12 ("For the first time, federal appeals court in
San Francisco recently ruled that detainees at the prison camp are entitled to constitutional rights in
U.S. courts because the United States 'possesses and exercises all the attributes of sovereignty on the
base."). "At last report, the 600 Guantanamo detainees were being held in what one U.S. official called
the 'legal equivalent of outer space. There have been more than 30 suicide attempts at Camp X-Ray
and reportedly 5% of the detainees are being treated for psychological disorders. Gerald D. Skoning,
Our 'Disappeared' NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27 2003, at 23. "The International Red Cross said that many
detainees held by the US military in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were suffering 'a worrying deterioration'
in mental health because Washington had ignored appeals to give them legal rights. Mental Health
Fear Over Guantanamo, BELFAST NEWSL., Oct. 11, 2003, at 17
9. The Bush administration has announced that some of the detainees will be tried by military
commissions. James Meek, The People the Law Forgot, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 3, 2003, at 1. But
"a uniformed source with intimate knowledge of the mood among the current military defence team
[indicates] that there is deep unhappiness about the commission set up. Id. The source described the
commission's structure in unflattering terms: "'Its like you took military justice, gave it to prosecutor
and said: "modify it any way you want .... Id. The commission has been described by lawyer
representing some of the British detainees as "'multi-headed hydra with [deputy secretary of defense]
Paul Wolfowitz's face on every head."' Id. This is because of
the enormous power vested in the US deputy secretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz, who
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The court appeared unconcerned that the detentions were accidental,' ° or even
worse, lacked supporting evidence and possibly violated international laws and
obligations. "
The third event came less than a week later Before U.S. forces invaded Iraq,
the Bush administration publicly identified nine Iraqi officials who it asserted
"would be tried for war crimes or crimes against humanity after an American-led
attack on Iraq."' 2 Despite that at the time the announcement was made,
international public opinion seemed to question the validity of the Bush
administration's preemptive war in Iraq, 13 the administration, without irony, issued
a decision to seek prosecutions based on international law against Iraqi officials.
The list of Iraqi officials who were to be prosecuted was also issued without any
attempt to explain the apparent contradiction between the decision to prosecute
them and the the administration's contrary position with respect to the ICC.
These three events are mentioned as an introduction to the broader problem of
which this Article seeks to address but a tiny part. The problem is exemplified by
the almost total lack of domestic public reaction to the three events, and the
absence of public outcry epitomizes the American publics's reaction to the many
arguably questionable foreign policy actions of the U.S. in the past fifty-plus years.
is the commissions appointing authority The judges seven in a capital case are appointed
by Wolfowitz. Any judge can be substituted up to the moment of verdict, by Wolfowitz.
The military prosecutors are chosen by Wolfowitz. The suspects they charge, and the
charges they make, are determined by Wolfowitz. All defendants are entitled to
military defence lawyer, from a pool chosen by Wolfowitz. The defendants are entitled
to hire a civilian lawyer, but they have to pay out of their own funds, and by revealing
where the funds are, they risk having them seized on suspicion of their being used for
terrorist purposes, on the order of Wolfowitz. Defendants need not lose heart completely
if convicted. They can appeal, to a panel of three people, appointed by Wolfowitz. When
it has made its recommendation, the panel sends it for a final decision to Wolfowitz.
Id
10. "[T]here is little doubt that some of [the] detainees captured in Afghanistan may be victims
of guilt by association or being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Skoning, supra note 8. Clive
Stafford-Smith, a defense attorney for some of the Brtions held at Guantanamo Bay, told The Guardian
that one of the commission prosecutors told him that the prosecutor "'think[s] 30% of the people in
Guantanamo Bay [had] nothing to do with anything. They were just in the wrong place at the wrong
time."' Meek, supra note 9.
II. Amnesty International USA claims the "continued denial of access to legal counsel violate[s]
U.S. obligations under international law. Vicin, supra note 5. See generally Meek, supra note 9. The
Bush administration's "first step away from international norms was to refuse to categonse the
Afghanistan captives as prisoners of war. Id. "It calls them 'enemy combatants, a term not recognized
in intemational law. Id The position of the Bush administration was further eroded by its cynical
assertions during the invasion of Iraq that U.S. soldiers were entitled to the full protection of the Geneva
conventions. See, e.g., U.S. General Says No Access to American POWs, Reuters, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/wire/US/reuters20030330l158.html (Mar. 30, 2003).
12. Report: U.S. Names Iraqis to Face War Crimes Trial, Reuters, available at
http://www.abcnews.go.comwire/Politics/reuters20030316._88.html (Mar. 16, 2003). For one of the
officials named in the list, the administration reportedly gave as grounds for seeking the prosecution
that the individual was accused of "hiding weapons of mass destruction. Id.
13. See America Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties But Post-War Iraq Will
Be Better Off, Most Say, The Pew Research Center, available at http://people-
press.org/prints.php3?PagelD=680 (Mar. 18, 2003).
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Unfortunately, this problem has profound implications for the continued existence
of the international legal system. It is a problem that is difficult to frame precisely,
but one that pervades domestic public opinion about U.S. foreign policy Author
Ariel Dorfman describes the problem as such:
The history of America, and the very particular sort of empire that it became,
seems to have allowed the process of the infantilization of the adult to be
accompanied by images or intimations of innocence which were uniquely
powerful and all its own. America has been interpreted, time and again, as the
domain of innocence. In a sense, a more extraordinary feat than changing thirteen
colonies into a global empire in less than two centuries is that the U.S. managed to
do it without its people losing their basic intuition that they were good, clean, and
wholesome. Its citizens never recognized themselves as an empire, never felt
bound by the responsibility (or the moral corruption) that comes with the exercise
of so much power. The Americans wanted the spoils of empire, but were
not ready to assume the excruciating dilemmas that went with the knowledge of
what they were imposing upon others. They desired power which can only come
from being large, aggressive, and overbearing; but simultaneously only felt
comfortable if other people assented to the image they had of themselves as naive,
frolicsome, unable to harm a mouse. Unlimited frontiers, abundance and plenty,
the feeling of being reborn at every crossroads, led to the belief that growth and
power need not relinquish, let alone destroy, innocence. Whatever obstructed and
contradicted this vision was painted over by a curious sort of memory that
reshaped the recent and receding past into myth as it moved. 14
In short, the problem is that Americans tend to evaluate their own nation's
actions and actors with red, white, and blue-colored glasses.
It is against this tide of sentiment that this Article seeks to move. It attempts
to be a counter-narrative to the deeply held but unstated belief among vast numbers
of the American public that U.S. government and military officials can never be
international criminals because international law really only exists to protect
Americans from others. Because the majority of the American public sees the U.S.
and its actors as perpetually innocent in deed and in motive, U.S. officials have had
license to carry out great many actions that upon further examination might cause
great consternation among the informed electorate.
This Article seeks to address a single thread of this grand tapestry of
collective denial: Henry Kissinger's role in the killing of East Timorese civilians
by the Indonesian military in the mid-1970s. 5 It is no doubt a topic about which a
majority of Americans are completely unaware, illustrating Ariel Dorfman's point.
Because the extent of Henry Kissinger's role in and responsibility for the death of
innocents in East Timor is vastly larger than this Article can possibly hope to
reach, the discussion is limited to a few select topics. The topics selected were
chosen somewhat arbitrarily but are intended to give a basic foundation to the
discussion of the broader topic, that is, holding U.S. officials like Henry Kissinger
14. ARIEL DORFMAN, THE EMPIRE'S OLD CLOTHES 201-02 (1983).
15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER 90-91 (2001).
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responsible for the international laws they violate.
Section I of this Article bnefly addresses Henry Kissinger's history as it
relates to the extent and nature of his authority during the relevant periods of time,
and it recounts some recent attempts to hold him and other world leaders
accountable for past transgressions of domestic and international law Section I
also lays forth the currently known evidence supporting the case against Henry
Kissinger with respect to his role in East Timor.
Section I! begins with an overview of the possible international criminal laws,
both statutory and common, that could serve as a basis for trying Henry Kissinger.
The bulk of Section I! focuses on the body of international law known as "crimes
against humanity First, the historical evolution of the doctrine is explored; then
some current case law in the field is examined. Finally, Section 1I attempts to apply
the currently known evidence about Henry Kissinger's involvement in East Timor
against the common law doctrine of "crimes against humanity
Section III attempts to define the problem of Kissinger and others like him
avoiding prosecution as one of a fundamental double standard in international
relations. The double standard is enforced by the overwhelming power of the
United States vis-a-vis any other country or conceivable bloc of countries. Because
the United States is able to project, militarily and culturally its own vision (and
version) of justice on a worldwide scale, the views of the American public are
uniquely and disproportionately mfluential in world affairs.
Further, because the American public suffers from an ability to reshape its
history in order to (re)confirm its "innocent and harmless" self-conception, the
myth of American innocence becomes the accepted and acceptable history and
version of events. This double standard, it is argued in Section II, seems to have
several important implications, many of which are unpleasant, including the
possibility of further strife and the use of international law as a tool of oppression.
SECTION 1: THE CRIME
His own lonely impunity is rank; it smells to heaven. If it is allowed to persist then
we shall shamefully vindicate the ancient philosopher Anacharsts, who
maintained that laws were like cobwebs: strong enough to detain only the weak,
and too weak to hold the strong. In the name of innumerable victims known and
unknown, it is time for justice to take a hand
Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger
16
A. Kissinger s Positions of Power
To understand why the responsibility for foreign policy actions of an entire
nation may be laid at the feet of a single leader or a small cadre of leaders, it is
16. Id. at xi.
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necessary to understand the context in which the actions transpired. More
precisely, when assessing his culpability it is important to understand the positions
of power held by Henry Kissinger during the relevant years.
Following the hotly contested presidential election of 1968, which saw
Richard Nixon claim victory over then Vice President Hubert Humphery, Nixon
made Kissinger, as his very first appointment, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (currently known as the National Security Advisor). 7 In
that position, Kissinger "revised and fashioned [the National Security Council
apparatus] to serve his needs and objectives."' "S
Sometime in 1969 during Nixon's first official year as president, Kissinger
was also appointed as chairman of the "Forty Committee, a position he held until
1976.'9 While not a well publicized decision-making body, and one that has gone
through at least three name changes since its inception, it is indeed an actual
governmental body and not simply the fiction of conspiracy theorists. The Forty
Committee, originally known as the "Special Group" under the Eisenhower
administration, was established as a "monitoring or watchdog body to oversee
covert operations. '20 President Ford described the Forty Committee as being
charged with the task of reviewing "'every covert operation undertaken by our
government. ,, 2i In sum, "Kissinger may be at least presumed to have had direct
knowledge of, and responsibility for" every major American covert operation
occurring between 1969 and 1976.22
Completing his triumvirate of power positions, Kissinger was sworn in as the
56th Secretary of State on September 22, 1973.23 Kissinger retained his position as
National Security Advisor and his chairmanship of the Forty Committee. 24 He was
the first person in U.S. history to "simultaneously [hold] the positions of National
Secruity Advis[olr and Secretary of State., 25 Although Kissinger lost his post as
17. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). The National Security Advisor acts as chairman of the
National Security Council, "a position where every important intelligence plan" must pass for approval.
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Prior to this appointment, Kissinger was an academic who closely allied
himself with Republican Nelson Rockefeller. Id. at II. How a "mediocre and opportunist academic"
was able to leapfrog to the highest echelons of power is a question open to debate. Id. at 16. While the
mere fortuity of election events or perseverance of Kissinger s character could be responsible, author
Christopher Hitchens has suggested far more sinister machinations were at play in this quite incredible
promotion. Id. at 6-16.
18. History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997 The White House Website, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
19. See generally HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 16-18 (providing brief history of this quasi-secret
government body). See also History of the National Security Council, supra note 18.
20. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 16.
21. Id. at 17
22. Id. at 18.
23. See Henry Kissinger Biography, Nobel -Museum, at
http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1973/kissinger-bio.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); see also
Henry A. Kissinger, 1973 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, at http://www.personal-selection.com/
Kissinger.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
24. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 78.
25. See History of the National Security Council, supra note 18.
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National Security Advisor under Ford on November 3, 1975,26 he later admitted
that the loss "in no way diminished his real power.", 27 In addition to the Forty
Committee, Kissinger also "chaired six NSC-related committees: the Senior
Review Group (non-crisis, non-arms control matters), the Washington Special
Actions Group (serious crises), the Verification Panel (arms control
negotiations), the Intelligence Committee (policy for the intelligence
community), and the Defense Program Review Committee (relation of the defense
budget to foreign policy aims). ' 28 Kissinger's accumulation of many key
government positions during his tenure in office led his former aide to describe
him as "no less than acting chief of state for national security ,29
Because Kissinger arguably had more power over U.S. foreign policy
decisions than anyone, save for the president himself, it would not be unreasonable
to hold him responsible for any major foreign policy decision made when he held
these prestigious positions. However, the case against Kissinger goes far beyond
mere circumstantial evidence of knowledge and potential control. It is simply
important to note that a few leaders can be responsible for the foreign policy
actions of an entire country, and more importantly, deserve to stand trial for their
commission. Moreover, because the trial of one powerful government official
never precludes prosecutors from trying other participants later, there is no
sufficient justification for failing to prosecute the most notorious culprits.
B. The Crimes of Kissinger
The allegations of the criminal activity surrounding Kissinger are not new*
numerous authors have charged Kissinger, Nixon, and others in the Nixon and
Ford administrations with bending and violating international and domestic law in
executing their foreign policy decisions.30 While conventional wisdom holds that
Kissinger will never stand trial for both administrations' violations of international
law, several recent developments have raised the (remote) possibility of bringing
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 38.
29. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kissinger's National
Security Council aide Roger Morris purportedly made the statement. Id. Kissinger's real influence
within both the Nixon and Ford administrations cannot be adequately understood by a simple recitation
of his official positions; his influence over both the presidents and their policies was allegedly immense.
See generally History of the National Security Council, supra note 18 (describing Kissinger as
"dominating U.S. foreign policy dunng the Nixon Presidency, and as keeping "Ford's confidence
and unlimited access"). For example, because of Ford's relative inexperience in foreign affairs, he
"relied almost exclusively on Kissinger's expertise and advice. Id.
30. See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE
HOUSE (1983); WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW- KISSINGER, NIXON, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
CAMBODIA (1987); ANTHONY SUMMERS, THE ARROGANCE OF POWER: THE SECRET WORLD OF
RICHARD NIXON (2000); LARRY BERMAN, No PEACE, No HONOR: NIXON, KISSINGER, AND BETRAYAL
IN VIETNAM (2001); John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled)
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990); John Hart Ely, The
American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42
STAN. L. REV 1093 (1990).
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Henry Kissinger to justice for some of the crimes ascribed to him.
The first development was Great Britain's decision to allow General Pinochet
to be extradited to Spain on torture charges and to deny him diplomatic immunity
as a former head of state.3 1 Although Pinochet was later released before facing the
extradition because of severely declining health, the precedent justifying efforts to
bring other architects of atrocity was firmly established by the British House of
Lords.32
Since the Pinochet case, several countries and aggrieved families have taken
an interest in bringing Kissinger before a court to answer for his actions. While
Kissinger was vacationing in France, a magistrate summoned him on May 29
2001 to answer questions about his involvement in and knowledge of Operation
Condor.33 Kissinger left his hotel that very day surrounded by bodyguards and
refused to answer the magistrate's questions;34 the U.S. Embassy later informed the
French that Kissinger was "too busy" to answer questions about his involvement.
35
The U.S. Embassy also told the French government that if they wanted to question
Kissinger, they should have used diplomatic channels rather than serving a
summons on the Former Secretary of State at his hotel.36 Apparently the French
magistrate had made such a request of Washington in 1999 but received no
response.37
3 1. For a full background on this case, see Melinda White, Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, and
Impunity, 7 Sw J. L. & TRADE AM. 209 (2000). Kissinger has essentially admitted that the Pinochet
precedent opened the door to the possibility of other former leaders being held to answer for their prior
transgressions of international law. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug., 2001, at 86.
32. See id. at 215-16. Another development was the publication of book by Christopher Hitchens
that specifically attempted to lay forth the criminal case against Henry Kissinger. In The Trial of Henry
Kissinger supra note 15, Hitchens attempted to outline all of the major foreign policy decisions for
which Kissinger could be prosecuted. While the book was light on legal analysis, his work does provide
useful summary of the current state of the evidence against Kissinger. For criticisms of Hitchens's
book, including its sparse legal analysis, see Douglass W Cassel, Jr., Crimes in Print, Not Battle, CHIC.
DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 7, 2001, at 5; Douglass W Cassel, Jr., Hitchens Hatchet Job, CHIC. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 1, 2001, at 5; Douglass W Cassel, Jr., Grave Charges, Tough Standard, CHIC. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 15, 2001, at 5; Faisal I. Chaudhry, Reviewing the International Law of Accomplice
Liability: Henry Kissinger in Pinochet' Chile, KISSINGER WATCH, Jan. 10, 2002, at 4, available at
http://www.icai-online.orgxp-resources/icai/kw 15.pdf.
33. The magistrate was investigating the alleged kidnapping and murder of five French citizens in
Chile by the Pinochet regime. See Adam Sage, Kissinger Summoned by French Magistrate, TIMES
(London), May 30, 2001, at I1. Recently declassified CIA documents alerted the magistrate to the
possible connection of Kissinger to the crimes committed by Pinochet. Id. "Operation Condor was a
coordinated effort in the 1970s by the secret police forces of seven South American dictatorships. The
death squads of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia agreed to pool
[their] resources to hunt down, torture, murder, and otherwise 'disappear' one another's dissidents.
Christopher Hitchens, The Fugitive, NATION, June 25, 2001, at 9. Kissinger has been alleged to have
heavily supported the covert murders and "disappearances" in South America, himself deeply involved
in the covert operations of the CIA as chairman of the Forty Committee. See id.
34. Hitchens, supra note 33.
35. Sage, supra note 33.
36. Hitchens, supra note 33.
37. Id.
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Just days after Kissinger received his summons in France, a judge in
Argentina indicated he might also seek to depose Kissinger in another
investigation regarding Operation Condor.38 On September 10, 2001, the family of
a slain Chilean military commander brought suit in federal court against Kissinger,
Richard M. Helms and other Nixon-era officials for "organizing and directing a
series of covert activities that resulted in [the Chilean commander's]
assassination., 39 The very next day, a similar suit was filed in Chile alleging
Kissinger and associates assisted dictators Augusto Pinochet of Chile and Jorge
Videla of Argentina in committing crimes against humanity 40 Thus, whatever
sense of security Kissinger once had about never facing such a prosecution must be
wavering.
While most of the legal action has been connected to Kissinger's role in South
America, there are several other viable areas of inquiry Beyond South America,
there are Kissinger's policy actions in Indochina and the allegedly illegal
bombings of Laos and Cambodia; the political assassination of a democratic leader
in Bangladesh; the encouragement of a bloody division of Cyprus by Greece and
Turkey- and the slaughter of 300,000 people, mostly civilians, in East Timor.4i
Ironically Kissinger's alleged crimes in East Timor are probably the least known
by the American public and yet are perhaps his most atrocious and those most
supported by available evidence.
C. East Timor
42
On December 7 1975, Australian journalists picked up this radio broadcast
from East Timor: 'The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately Women and
children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be killed. This is an
appeal for international help. Please do something to stop this. ,43 The
Indonesian invasion of East Timor commenced on that day resulted in a slaughter
of 100,000 East Timorese in the first year alone. 44 Nearly a full third of the
population, 200,000 out of a total population of just 650,000, perished in the
38. Id., see also Marc Cooper, Restoring Chile Past, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at M6.
39. Bruce Zagaris, Nixon Administration Officials Sued in Chile and U.S. for Atrocities in
Operator [sic] Condor 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP (Nov. 2001).
40. Id.
41. All of these incidents and the evidence of Kissinger's responsibility in them are explored in
detail in HITCHENS, supra note 15.
42. The East Timor Action Network/US is grassroots political organization fighting to protect
human rights in East Timor. It maintains an excellent website at: http://www.etan.org (last visited Nov.
20, 2003).
43. Eric Black, East Timor Highlights Inconsistent U.S. Policy, Indonesia Invaded the Island with
Advance US. Knowledge, and US.-Supplied Weapons Were Used in the Slaughter of Tens of
Thousands, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), June 6, 1999, at 19A.
44. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975-76, in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2003) (internal citations
omitted throughout) [hereinafter Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion]; see also Ben Kiernan,
Dramatic U-Turn for US and Australia, BANGKOK POST, May 19, 2002, at 1.
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twenty-five year campaign.
1. Background
In April of 1974, Portugal's authoritarian government was overthrown by a
leftist military revolt, which consequently encouraged independence movements in
the Portuguese colony of East Timor.46 The new Portuguese government supported
a gradual transition to independence for the colony 47 Tucked in the southern edge
of the Indonesian archipelago, the tiny island nation was split between two
factions. The first faction was an unstable coalition formed in January of 1975
between the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), with the support of the elites and
"senior Portuguese colonial administrators, 48  and the "vaguely leftist, 49
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), with a constituency
of the "younger Timorese and lower-level colonial officials." 50 While Fretilin had
a "more progressive stance toward full independence from Portugal, the common
ground between the UDT and Fretilin was the eventual decolonization and
independence of East Timor.5i
The second main faction influencing East Timor was Indonesia and its
supporters within East Timor. Amid the power vacuum left by Portugal's political
instability and inability to control East Timor,52 Indonesia graciously filled the
void with thoughts of annexing the tiny island nation and making it Indonesia's
twenty-seventh province.53 To this end, the Indonesian government supported the
pro-integration Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) with financial
assistance and propaganda; however, the party never enjoyed much popular
support.54
With the UDT-Fretilin alliance crumbling in the summer of 1975, Fretilin
45. Black, supra note 43; see also MICHAEL PARENTi, AGAINST EMPIRE 26-27 (1995) (discussing
America's role in East Timor, Indonesia, and other countries as part of an aggressively interventionist
foreign policy). Besides outright murder, many of deaths are also attributable to "starvation or disease
in [the] camps where the Indonesians had incarcerated [the East Timorese] so the population could be
controlled while the military tried to eliminate the remaining resistance. Black, supra note 43; see
Michael Richardson, How U.S. Averted Gaze When Indonesia Took East Timor INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
May 20, 2002, at 2 ("In 1979, three years after Jakarta formally annexed East Timor as an Indonesian
province, the U.S. Agency for International Development estimated that 300,000 East Timorese-
nearly half the population- had been uprooted and moved into camps controlled by the Indonesian
armed forces.").
46. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Briefing Paper- Indonesia and Portuguese Timor (Nov. 21, 1975), in
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr &
Michael L. Evans eds.), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc3a.pdf
(last visited Nov. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Briefing Paper" Indonesia and East Timor].
50. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
51. Id.
52. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 91.
53. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
54. Id.
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sought control of the government. It evidenced its popular support by winning
fifty-five percent in local elections in July of 1975." After a brief military skirmish
between Fretilin and UDT supporters (which was largely provoked by Indonesian
propaganda),5 6 Fretilin gained political and military control of nearly all of East
Timor.57 Despite having control over the country, Fretilin moderated its position on
independence. Rather than demanding immediate independence, Fretilin began to
advocate an approach similar to the plan of gradual independence it had developed
with the UDT 58
In October of 1975, General Suharto, the dictator of Indonesia and a close
U.S. ally, began to grow weary of purely political tactics and experimented with
sending "Indonesian special forces to infiltrate secretly into East Timor in an
effort to provoke clashes that would provide the pretext for a full-scale invasion." 59
Because the first wave of attacks failed to provoke any response from the West,
Indonesia increased the cross-border attacks by its troops "outfitted with American
[military] equipment. ' 6° Although Fretilin petitioned the United Nations (U.N.)
and requested that it call for the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces, the
Indonesian attacks finally drove Fretilin to unilaterally declare independence on
November 28, 1975.61 On December 7 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale
invasion of East Timor using American supplied weapons almost exclusively 62
2. A Note About the Evidence
It should be noted at the outset that this Article does not intend to present a
full account of the evidence against Kissinger for his alleged crimes in East Timor.
In fact, no author could compile such a presentation on any of the violations of law
alleged against Henry Kissinger because of the sheer lack of access to the most
61probative evidence. Upon leaving the State Department, Kissinger made an
55. Id.
56. "The outbreak of civil war disrupted Portuguese plans for orderly decolonization, prompting
its officials to retreat from Dili [, East Timor] to the offshore island of Atauro. In effect, Portugal
abandoned East Timor. Richardson, supra note 45.
57. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
58. Id.
59. Id., see also HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 91 (discussing how the "infiltration of Indonesian
regular units into East Timor" was motivated to subvert the local government); Black, supra note 43
(noting that the "CIA reported that Indonesia had sent agents into East Timor to provoke violent
incidents so it could claim- as Indonesia soon did claim- that it was intervening to quell a civil war").
60. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
61. Id. Fretilin made the unilateral declaration of independence "apparently in the belief that a
sovereign state would have greater success in appealing for help from the United Nations. Richardson,
supra note 45. According to Jose Ramos-Horta, Fretilin's foreign affairs spokesman at the time, "'The
unilateral declaration was an act of desparation, essentially forced upon the leadership of Fretilin in the
face of abandonment from everybody."' Id.
62. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44., see also HITCHENS, supra note
15, at 91; Black, supra note 43; Richardson, supra note 45.
63. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44; see also HITCHENS, supra note
15, at xi, 3, 76. "Alistair Hodgett, Amnesty International's American media director, says his agency
can do little until the government declassifies reams of information. James Ridgeway, Manhattan
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"extraordinary bargan"64 in which he gave his papers to the Library of Congress
with the condition that they remain under seal until five years after his death.65
Thus, what evidence still exists and has not been destroyed by Kissinger remains
under lock and key and the world remains unable to uncover the crucial evidence it
needs to bring this alleged international criminal to justice. 66
Because the most penetrating evidence cannot be accessed, this Article can
only hope to construct a general outline of facts surrounding Kissinger's
involvement in the massacre of one-third of East Timor's population. However, the
existing evidence does seem compelling enough to justify an extended
investigation into the matter accompanied by the declassification of more
documents on the subject.67 Although an international body or foreign state would
probably require substantial evidence before indicting a former head of state or
high ranking official, the currently available evidence appears at least convincing
enough to proceed with further investigation,68 including the declassification and
release of all relevant documents on the matter. 69 The key implication of observing
Milosevic, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 21, 2001, at 34.
64. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 76.
65. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 455 U.S. 136, 141 (1980). In
1980, the United States Supreme Court effectively placed the documents held at the Library of
Congress outside the reach of the American public, in whose name they were created. See generally id
The documents "include authentic telephone transcripts of virtually every important meeting
[Kissinger] had. Scott Armstrong, Forum Discussion: Regarding Henry Kissinger Feb. 22, 2001,
available at http://www.harpers.org/RegardingHenryKissinger.html.
66. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at xi. The impossibility of building case against Kissinger without
access to these documents is amply demonstrated by the problems encountered by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in its
ongoing investigation of General Pinochet. The FBI has been pursuing this more actively
than has been publicly reported. But even public reports acknowledge that there's now
enough information to indict General Pinochet in the United States. However, the best
evidence is in the Library of Congress. The FBI is getting some access to that evidence,
but it has to negotiate with Henry Kissinger's lawyers. These are government records
needed in a criminal investigation for which the United States government has to
negotiate access.
Armstrong, supra note 65.
67 The National Security Archive at George Washington University has been active in locating
documents relating to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor and the U.S.'s role in it. Through the
Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Archive was able to get two key pieces of evidence
declassified by the Gerald R. Ford Library on December 6, 2001. The National Security Archive was
also able to find several other crucial documents in the National Archive. All of the documents are
available from its website at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). The National
Security Archive was also able to obtain two memoranda related to Kissinger's activities in South
America in December 2003. See Duncan Campbell, Kissinger Approved Argentinian 'Dirty War
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 6, 2003, at 23.
68. Following 1999 outburst of violence in East Timor and the subsequent intervention by U.S.
troops, human rights commission called on the U.N. to set up war crimes tribunal, and the human
rights group East Timor Action Network urged the U.N. to extend the tribunal's jurisdiction to the
alleged crimes by Kissinger. Ridgeway, supra note 63.
69. The claim that these papers cannot be released due to national security concerns rings
particularly hollow. A full quarter of a century has passed since the events that gave rise to these State
Department and National Security documents occurred. Any claim that the documents contain
"sensitive material" must be treated with skepticism; the documents should be released, in whatever
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that the most relevant and revealing evidence is under lock and key is that the
"insufficient evidence" argument cannot be maintained. Until access to that
evidence is allowed, any dismissal of Kissinger's culpability for a lack of evidence
would be hasty and premature.
3. The Evidence Against Kissinger
It is initially important to note that President Ford and Secretary of State
Kissinger actually visited General Suharto in Jakarta on December 6, 1975, the day
prior to the full-scale invasion. 7 It is also important to note that Kissinger and Ford
were fully apprised of the situation in East Timor and were well aware of General
Suharto's intentions for the region as far back as July of 1975.71
redacted form is necessary to protect the perceived national security interest, and yet still allow for
full accounting of Kissinger's crimes. Moreover, as former Kissinger aide Roger Morms has aptly
stated:
In my experience very, very few of the redacted documents that are withheld from the
American public or Congress or from history concern genuine matters of national
security. It would be hard to estimate, but I would say 90 to 95 percent of the secrets
kept by the American government are secrets of expedience and political convenience,
usually attendant on the administration in power, but sometimes on the reputations of
people who are still powerful, such as Henry Kissinger, so that his successors would in
their own interest, of course, and as part of the club mentality that obtains here, try to
prevent the release of incriminating documents. This is, as a famous governor of ours in
New Mexico once said, "a whole box full of Pandoras. Once you start opening this box,
culpability, as I said earlier, does not stop with Henry Kissinger. The foreign policy
establishment, and by larger extension the American political establishment, has very
great stake in the maintenance of these secrets. And Henry's secrets curl far beyond
murder and mayhem and genocide and great crimes of state. They curl back to corporate
and other collusions that are with us even today. Ultimately, what's at stake here is not
the national security, but national profit. And a good deal of money was made. The
foundation for the current oligarchy that prevails in American policy today foreign and
domestic was laid during the Nixon years. So these are very momentous matters, but
don't let anybody tell you that it's authentic national security. That's nonsense. This is
self-protection. But until we change our methods of governance, you're stuck with it.
Roger Morris, Forum Discussion: Regarding Henry Kissinger Feb. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.harpers.org/RegardingHenryKissinger.html.
70. See HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 91; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger Daily Schedule (Dec. 5 and 6, 1975), in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC
BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.) available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBBNSAEBB62/doc5.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003); U.S.
DEP'T OF State, Memorandum from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to President Ford: Your Visit
to Indonesia (Nov. Dec., 1975), in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No.
62 (Dec. 6, 2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBBINSAEBB62/doc3.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003); Briefing
Paper Indonesia and Portuguese Timor supra note 49.
71. A recently declassified Memorandum of Conversation, detailing meeting between President
Ford, General Suharto, Kissinger, and others, shows that American officials were cognizant of
Indonesia's military ambitions in East Timor and expressed no reservations about the impending
invasion. At July 5, 1975 meeting between General Suharto and President Ford, the following
exchange occurred:
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On December 6, 1975, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger met
General Suharto in Jakarta in a brief one-day stopover following a trip to Beijing.
72
Suharto: The third point I want to raise is Portuguese decolonization. Starting with
our basic principle, the new Constitution of 1945, Indonesia will not commit aggression
against other countries. So Indonesia will not use force against the territory of other
countries. With respect to Timor, we support carrying out decolonization through the
process of self-determination. In ascertaining the views of the Timor people, there are
three possibilities: independence, staying with Portugal, or to join Indonesia. With such a
small territory and no resources, an independent country would hardly be viable. With
Portugal it would be a big burden with Portugal so far away. If they want to integrate
into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not possible because Indonesia is one
unitary state. So the only way is to integrate into Indonesia.
President [Ford]: Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to
make their choice [about whether to become independent, remain with Portugal, or
integrate into Indonesia]?
Suharto: There is no set date yet, but is is [sic] agreed in principle that the wishes of the
people will be sought. The problem is that those who want independence are those who
are Communist-influenced Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to
heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. I want to assert that Indonesia
doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to
manage the self-determination process with majority wanting unity with Indonesia.
These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.
President: I greatly appreciate the chance to learn your views. I would like to
mention OPEC.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto (July 5,
1975), at 6, in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6, 2001)
(William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/docl.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto].
Although Kissinger was not present at this exchange and only later joins the meeting, it is
important because it proves three things (Kissinger was no doubt well aware of its basic content). First,
that despite Suharto s official declarations that he did not intend to invade East Timor, he was clearly
hedging in that direction. He outlines the possible choices for the East Timorese people and then
decrees that the "only way is to integrate [East Timor] into Indonesia. Id. Despite Suharto's claim that
the pro-integration forces were supported by a majority of the population, Kissinger and Ford must have
known this was not the case following the local elections held that month that clearly demonstrated the
pro-independence Fretilin party enjoyed not only a plurality but clear majority of popular support. See
text accompanying supra note 61.
Second, that if Kissinger and Ford truly believed Suharto had no plans for an armed invasion in
East Timor as he stated, they should have questioned Suharto's veracity after it became known to them
that he was ordering armed invasions of the country in the fall of 1975. See Ford, Kissinger and the
Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44; see also HiTCHENS, supra note 15, at 91; Black, supra note 43;
supra note 59.
Third, the explicit reason for not allowing the pro-independence movement to succeed even if it
had won the majority of support in democratic elections was that Fretilin was "Communist-influenced"
and "almost communist. See Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto,
supra see also Briefing Paper- Indonesia and Portuguese Timor supra note 49 (calling Fretilin and
the independence movement "vaguely leftist") Thus, the underlying reason for a possible Indonesian
invasion was to overthrow duly elected government solely because of its member's political views.
72. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44.
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It is during this meeting that Kissinger and Ford allegedly gave the "green light" to
General Suharto to commence his invasion of East Timor.73 The issues raised are
central to any case against Kissinger: did Kissinger and Ford have previous,
credible knowledge of the impending invasion, and, if so, what were their policy
actions following disclosure of the information? For his part, Kissinger has also
understood that this is a crucial issue in his defense and has taken great care to
claim that he had no real knowledge about Indonesia's planned attack.74 Kissinger
has in the past said: "[East] Timor was never discussed with us when we were in
Indonesia. At the airport as we were leaving, the Indonesians told us that they were
going to occupy the Portuguese colony of Timor. It was literally told to us as
we were leaving.,
7 5
However, newly uncovered State Department documents directly refute this
statement. A recently declassified State Department telegram 76 containing the
transcripts of the December 6, 1975 meeting between General Suharto, President
Ford, and Secretary of State Kissinger specifically rebuts Kissinger's claim that he
was uninformed about the planned invasion:
77
39 [Suharto-] I would like to speak to you, Mr. President, about another prbelm
[sic], Timor. In the latest Rome agreement the Portuguese government wanted
to invite all parties to negotiate. Similar efforts were made before but Fretilin did
not attend. After the Fretilin forces occupied certain points and other forces were
unable to consolidate, Fretelin [sic] has declared its independence unilaterally. In
consequence, other parties declared thei [sic] intention of integrating with
Indonesia. If this continues it will prolong the suffering of the refugees and
increase the instability in the area.
73. Id. Philip Liechty, a former CIA agent in Indonesia at the time of the invasion, has commented
on film that General Suharto "was explicitly given the green light to do what he did" by President Ford
and Kissinger. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Hidden Horror N.Y TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at
A23.
74. On July 11 1995, Kissinger spoke at an event in New York sponsored by the Learning Annex.
After his talk, he took questions from the audience. Members of the East Timor Action Network present
at the event rose to question Kissinger about his policy toward East Timor. East Timor Action Network,
Ask Kissinger About East Timor- Confronting Henry Kissinger (Aug. 1995), at
http://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). The transcript is also reprinted in
HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 93-98.
75. HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 94; see also Richardson, supra note 45.
76. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Telegram from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger (Dec. 6, 1975), in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK
NO. 62, Dec. 6, 2001 (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivNSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc4.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Telegram from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger].
77 Other documents also show that Kissinger had advance knowledge of the planned invasion.
One in particular has been cited in Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44. It is
State Department cable Kissinger received on December 4th or 5th "suggesting the Indonesians had
plans to invade East Timor. Id., see also id at fn. 25. The cable itself, Plans for Indonesian Invasion
of East Timor is still classified, but it is cited by its title and number in list of cables Kissinger
received while on his trip to East Asia. The list is available at National Archives, Record Group 59,
Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-76, Box 227 President Ford's Trip to the Far East
(Follow-Up) Nov./Dec. 1975.
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40. Ford- The four other parties have asked for integration?
41. Suharto- Yes, after the UDT, Indonesia found itself facing a fate accompli
[sic]. It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and
order for the present and the future interest of the security of the area nd [sic]
Indonesia. These are some of the considerations we are now contemplating. We
want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.
42. Ford- We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand
the problem you have and the intentions you have.
43. Kissinger- You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create
problems.
[44.] Ford- We could have technical and legal problems. You are familiar, Mr.
President, with the problems we had on Cyprus although this situation is different.
45. Kissinger- It depends on how we construe it: whether it is in self defense or is
a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We
would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens
after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an
unauthonzed way. The president will be back on Monday at 2:00 PM Jakarta
time. We understand your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only
saying that it would be better if it were done after we returned.
46. Ford- It would be more authoritative if we can do it in person.
47 Kissinger- Whatever you do, however, we wil [sic] try to handle in the best
way possible.
48. Ford- We recognize that you have a time factor. We have merely expressed
our view from our particular point of view.
49. Kissinger- If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet
until the president returns home.
50. [Kissinger-] Do you anticipate a long guerilla war there?
51 Suharto- There willprobably [sic] be a small guerilla war. The local kings are
important, however, and [sic] they are on our side. The UDT represents former
government officials and Fretelin [sic] represents former soldiers. They are
infected the same as is the Portuguese army with communism.
7 8
78. Telegram from the American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
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This is an important piece of evidence because it shows that Kissinger and
Ford: (1) had knowledge of the impending invasion; (2) had the opportunity to
object to an invasion they knew would involve the illegal use of American
supplied military equipment; and (3) failed to express any objection or raise
reservations about the invasion or about how it would be carried out.79 It also
shows Kissinger had plans to deceive the American people (and presumably
Congress) about the nature of the invasion. This evidence is crucial because
American law forbade the use of U.S.-supplied weapons by recipient governments
for any purposes but self-defense and required State Department officials to stop
all shipments of arms to any country offending this law.
80
This last point is particularly important in the case against Henry Kissinger-
first, as Secretary of State, he had the duty to uphold American law and halt arms
shipments to Indonesia after he learned of its planned invasion of East Timor, a
duty he clearly breached; second, it demonstrates that as a direct result of his
illegal acts, potentially hundreds-of-thousands of Timorese were massacredsi
However, Kissinger's culpable acts extend beyond mere omissions to act and in
fact include affirmative acts to deceive Congress about the invasion in East Timor
and about American arms shipments to Suharto s military machine. 2
After the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, Kissinger, following the plan he
laid out in the December 6, 1975 meeting with Suharto, worked diligently to
continue the flow of weapons to the Indonesian military After subordinate
officials in the State Department wrote a memorandum recommending that the
arms shipments to Indonesia be halted pursuant to American law, and the
memorandum was cabled to Kissinger while he was abroad, Kissinger, upon his
return, discussed the memorandum in a meeting with other State Department
officials:
supra note 76.
79 According to the CIA, Suharto was reluctant to invade for fear of losing U.S. military aid.
Black, supra note 43.
80. See HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 100-01; Black, supra note 43; Ford, Kissinger and the
Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44; Richardson, supra note 45.
81. A 1977 congressional subcommittee investigating the arms shipments to Indonesia found that
"U.S. supplied weapons to Indonesia roughly doubled between 1975 and 1978, the period when the
killing in East Timor was at is peak. Black, supra note 43. While it is impossible to know if the
Indonesians could have carried out their invasion without new infusion of military equipment from the
U.S., it is particularly interesting to note that in the meeting of December 6, 1975, General Suharto
asked for United States assistance in the construction of an M-16 rifle plant, complaining that defending
his territory "requires substantial small arms. Telegram fom the American Embassy in Jakarta to
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger supra note 76. Kissinger responded that the United States would
"favor" such a plan and President Ford indicated the United States would be "enthusiastic about such a
concept. Id. Also, because of Indonesia's need for U.S. financial support, it was known that the U.S.
could use the threat of withdrawing aid to exert substantial leverage over Indonesian policy. See supra
note 79
82. While it is easy to confuse violations of American law and international law in this matter, this
Article attempts to draw firm line between the two. It is important to stress that Kissinger's possible
violations of American law do not necessarily make him culpable for international crimes. It is also
important, however, to have full understanding of all of Kissinger's actions in this matter before
considering the legal requirements of international criminal law.
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants: The Secretary [Henry Kissinger;] Deputy Secretary Robert
Ingersoll[;] Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco[;] Under Secretary
Carlyle Maw[;] Deputy Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger[;] Assistant
Secretary Philip Habib[;] Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor[;] Jerry Bremer,
Notetaker[.] Date: December 18, 1975 Subject: Department Policy
The Secretary- I want to raise a little bit of hell about the Department's conduct in
my absence. Until last week I thought we had a disciplined group; now we've
gone to pieces completely. Take this cable on East Timor. You know my attitude
and anyone who knows my position as you do must know that I would not have
approved it. The only consequence is to put yourself on record. It is a disgrace to
treat the Secretary of State this way What possible explanation is there for it?
I had told you to stop it quietly. What is your place doing, Phil, to let this happen?
It is incomprehensible. It is wrong in substance and in procedure. It is a disgrace.
Were you here?
Habib: No.
Habib: Our assessment was that if it was going to be trouble, it would come up
before your return. And I was told they decided it was desirable to go ahead with
the cable.
The Secretary- Nonsense. I said do it for a few weeks and then open up again.
Habib: The cable will not leak.
The Secretary- Yes it will and it will go to Congress too and then we will have
hearings on it.
Habib: I was away. I was told by cable that it had come up.
The Secretary- That means that there are two cables! And that means twenty guys
have seen it.
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Habib: No, I got it back channel-it was just one paragraph double talk and
cryptic so I knew what it was talking about. I was told that Leigh thought that
there was a legal requirement to do it.
Leigh: No, I said it could be done administratively. It was not in our interest to do
it on legal grounds.
Sisco: We were told that you had decided we had to stop.
The Secretary- Just a minute, just a minute. You all know my view on this. You
must have an FSO-8 [Foreign Service Officer, class eight] who knows it well. It
will have a devastating impact on Indonesia. There's this masochism in the
extreme here. No one has complained that it was aggression.
Leigh: The Indonesians were violating an agreement with us.
The Secretary- The Israelis when they go into Lebanon-when was the last time
we protested that?
Leigh: That's a different situation.
Maw: It is self-defense.
The Secretary- And we can't construe Communist government in the middle of
Indonesia as self-defense?
Leigh: Well
The Secretary- Then you're saying that arms can't be used for defense.
Habib: No, they can be used for the defense of Indonesia.
The Secretary- On the Timor thing, that will leak in three months and it will
come out that Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law.
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How many people in L [the legal adviser's office] know about this?
Leigh: Three.
Habib: There are at least two in my office.
The Secretary- Plus everybody in the meeting so you're talking about not less than
15 or 20. You have a responsibility to recognize that we are living in a
revolutionary situation. Everything on paper will be used against me.
The Secretary- It cannot be that our agreement with Indonesia says that the arms
are for internal purposes only. I think you will find that it says that they are
legitimately used for self-defense. There are two problems. The merits of the case
which you have a duty to raise with me. The second is how to put these to me. But
to put it into a cable 30 hours before I return, knowing how cables are handled in
this building, guarantees that it will be a national disaster and that transcends
whatever Deputy Legal Adviser George Aldrich has in his feverish mind.
I took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle Maw to not
make any new sales. How will the situation get better in six weeks?
Habib: They may get it cleaned up by then.
The Secretary- The Department is falling apart and has reached the point where it
disobeys clear-cut orders.
Habib: We sent the cable because we thought it was needed and we thought it
needed your attention. This was ten days ago.
The Secretary- Nonsense. When did I get the cable, Jerry9
Bremer: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on Sunday.
83. Irony noted.
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The Secretary- You had to know what my view on this was. No one who has
worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on
Timor.
Habib: Well, let us look at it-talk to Leigh. There are still some legal
requirements. I can't understand why it went out if it was not legally required.
The Secretary- Am I wrong in assuming that the Indonesians will go up in smoke
if they hear about this?
Habib: Well, it s better than a cutoff. It could be done at a low level.
The Secretary- We have four weeks before Congress comes back. That's plenty of
time.
Leigh: The way to handle the administrative cutoff would be that we are studying
the situation.
The Secretary- And 36 hours was going to be a major problem?
Leigh: We had a meeting in Sisco's office and decided to send the message.
The Secretary- I know what the law is but how can it be in the US national interest
for us to give up on Angola and kick the Indonesians in the teeth? Once it is on
paper, there will be a lot of FSO-6's who can make themselves feel good who can
write for the Open Forum Panel on the thing even though I will turn out to be right
in the end.
Habib: The second problem on leaking of cables is different.
The Secretary- No, it's an empirical fact.
Eagleburger: Phil, it's a fact. You can't say that any NODIS [most restricted
distribution cable] will leak but you can't count on three to six months later
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someone asking for it in Congress. If it s part of the written record, it will be
dragged out eventually
The Secretary- You have an obligation to the national interest. I don't care if we
sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it. I get no rakeoff. But you
have an obligation to figure out how to serve your country. The Foreign Service is
not to serve itself. The Service stands for service to the United States and not
service to the Foreign Service.
Habib: I understand that that s what this cable would do.
The Secretary- The minute you put this into the system you cannot resolve it
without a finding.
Leigh: There only one question. What do we sav to Congress if we re asked?
The Secretary- We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in
January. 
84
This key piece of evidence is particularly damaging to Kissinger. First. it
shows there was a real effort on the part of lower State Department officials to
uphold American law and arms agreements, and that Kissinger was extremely
upset by this effort because it directly conflicted with his stated intentions. Second,
that the plan to continue supplying weapons to Indonesia, despite the results in
East Timor, was a well-considered and specific policy action on his part. Third,
that if the issue of use of the weapons by Indonesia became a problem, Kissinger
was prepared to call the action self-defense against the "communist government"
of East Timor. And finally if Congress investigated the matter, the State
Department's "official position" would be that it would cut off the arms supply
while it was studying the issue. In fact, the "bogus cutoff never occurred. 85
These actions show a concerted effort on the part of Kissinger and others in
84. Mark Hertsgaard, The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger- Minutes of 1975 Meeting with
Lawrence Eagleburger NATION, Oct. 29, 1990, at 473, available at http://etan.org/news/kissinger/
secret.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) (emphasis added).
85. Black, supra note 43. Despite the purported six-month review of whether Indonesia had
actually broken United States law by the State Department, weapon shipments already scheduled to go
to Indonesia prior to the invasion continued to flow. During the review period, the United States made
"four new offers of military equipment sales to Indonesia including maintenance and spare parts for the
Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations and employed
during the invasion in East Timor. Ford, Kissinger, and the Indonesian Invasion, supra note 44;
Richardson, supra note 45.
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the State Department to deceive Congress about the arms shipments and the
invasion of East Timor, and to aid and abet the Suharto regime in its massacre
there. This conspiracy to continue the arms shipments, including weapons
specifically used against the Timorese population, continued after the initial
invasion. Again, Kissinger was a major player in this endeavor. In a July 17 1976
State Department staff meeting, the issue of whether the United States should
accept an invitation by the Indonesian government to send a diplomatic
representative with a delegation of the Indonesian Parliament to East Timor arose:
Secretary Kissinger: Why is it in our interest to [send a diplomatic
representative]? I'm just trying to understand the rationale.
Mr. Miller [an adviser from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs]: Well, I
don't think, sir, we think in terms of it weakening the Indonesians in Timor; but
it s trying to keep, let's say, Congressional sentiment with regard to Indonesia
from being rekindled-which we think is a fairly satisfactory [sic] condition.
Mr. Habib: There s no need to take this action. The Indonesians are trying to get
an international-and especially U.S. and other blessing [sic] - before they ve
done it. Let them go ahead and do what they ve been doing. We have no
objection. They re quite happy with the position that we have taken. We ve
resumed, as vou know, all of our normal relations with them; and there isn't any
problem involved
Secretary Kissinger: Not very willingly-
Mr. Habib: Sir 9
Secretary Kissinger: Not very willingly. Illegally and beautifullv.
86
Again, this revealing piece of evidence helps unravel facts and assists in
building the case against Kissinger. It is crucial to note that Kissinger himself
admits that he and the State Department for which he was responsible broke
domestic law by continuing the arms shipments to Indonesia and resuming normal
relations with the murderous Suharto regime. The fact that he is beamingly proud
of this accomplishment is perhaps the most despicable aspect of the entire case.
To briefly summarize the evidence against Kissinger on the issue of the
Indonesian invasion of East Timor, it can at least be argued that there is a credible
case against Kissinger for materially assisting General Suharto in the murder of
nearly one-third of East Timor's population. He knew about the planned invasion
and did nothing to stop the Indonesians from illegally using American-supplied
86. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Transcript of Staff Meeting (June 17, 1976), in NATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 62 (Dec. 6,2001) (William Burr & Michael L. Evans eds.),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchivINSAEBB/NSAEBB62/doc6.pdf (last visited Nov 20,
2003) (emphasis added).
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weapons to carry out the attack. Furthermore, although it was his legal duty to
inform Congress of the invasion and recommend suspending arms transfers to
Indonesia following the attack, he not only failed to fulfill that duty but also
affirmatively assisted in executing a plan that did just the opposite. As a result of
his failure to object to the planned invasion, it is arguable that tens-of-thousands
perished in the ensuing attack. Moreover, as a result of his deceit to Congress and
his actions continuing the arms flow to Suharto, hundreds-of-thousands of
Timorese were killed. While these conclusions may be fairly debatable, what is not
debatable is that there is at least a plausible question about whether the charges are
accurate. While the existing evidence may or may not be adequate to support an
indictment, there is clearly enough on Kissinger to justify opening the stacks of
boxes containing the documents that could verify his culpability The fact that
Kissinger does not want the documents declassified only seems to justify the
position afortiori.
SECTION II: THE CRIME DEFINED
While some aspects of the law relating to crimes against humanity remain
ambiguous, that law core principle is both clear and widely accepted: atrocious
acts committed on a mass scale against racial, religious, or political groups must
be punished
Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts
87
While there are several legal frameworks by which to analyze Kissinger's
deeds, including the possibility of private action in domestic courts,8 8 this Article
focuses exclusively on the failure to bring Kissinger to justice for his alleged
violations of international law. Though several possible methods of bringing
perpetrators of international crimes to justice are available, this Article will only
discuss customary international law and specifically the doctrine of "crimes against
humanity
A. International Criminal Law
While the title of this section implies that there is a cohesive body of criminal
and human rights law at the international level, this implication would be
inaccurate. This area of law is better characterized as a patchwork of codified,
narrowly tailored laws that protect basic human rights. Underlying this framework
of positive law is customary international law, acting as an imperfect net to catch
the crimes that slip through the patchwork or as an additional penalty where
specific conventions are also applicable.89 The various precedents set by the
87 Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2594 (1991).
88. See Zagaris, supra note 39.
89. Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States explicitly
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Nuremberg trials are the primary source of customary international law, more
commonly referred to as "crimes against humanity "90
I Human Rights Conventions9'
Since World War II, various coalitions of the international community have
agreed to adhere to a number of conventions aimed at protecting against certain
human rights violations. For example, in 1951 the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide entered into force three years after it
was adopted by the United Nation's General Assembly 92 In 1966 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights followed, 93 as did the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
1987 94 The United States has been laggard in approving and enforcing these
conventions; it began enforcing the Genocide Convention as late as 1989 the
Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, and the Torture Convention in
1994.9'
Another set of applicable positive law, at least in the context of armed
conflict, is the various war crimes conventions, 96 typified by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 97 As the names of these conventions imply, they seek to
recognizes customary international law as source of governing law. It indicates that "[a] state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones" any one of a list of
enumerated crimes, including genocide, slavery, torture, racial discrimination, or any other "consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986) (defining "Customary International
Law of Human Rights"). While the statute only refers to the acts of states, it is interesting to note that
the comments to the restatement indicate that there is a presumption that the section has been violated if
such enumerated acts are tolerated and go unpunished by state, especially when the perpetrators are
state officials. Id. § 702 cmt. b. However, others argue that customary international law fails to provide
any recognizable legal standards and is little more than "utopian vaporings. ROBERT H. BORK,
COERCING VIRTUE 18-19 (2003). Bork accuses American scholars of employing international law as a
"weapon in the domestic culture war. Id. at 21. To Bork, "[ilnternational law is little more than
organized hypocrisy. Id. at 29 Moreover, Bork argues that the "entire enterprise of controlling armed
force by 'law' accomplishes little other than teaching disrespect for law and serving as the basis for
accusations of lawlessness after the fighting begins. Id. at 39.
90. See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2585-92.
91. For a brief overview of various international human rights agreements, see Orentlicher, supra
note 87 at 2563-85.
92. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 195 1) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"].
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter "Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"].
94. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (entered into force Jun.
26, 1987,for the United States Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter "Torture Convention"].
95. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 387, 392, 472 (2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal affairs/tifindex.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
96. War crimes are defined as "violation[s] of international law governing war. Major
Christopher Supernor, International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of
Justice, 50 A.F.L. REV. 215, 218 (2001).
97 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
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protect the defenseless, the wounded, non-combatants, and prisoners of war from
grave human rights abuses by warring nations or factions. 98 While both
international and domestic courts have defined "war crimes" by looking to both
codified agreements and customary law," and commentators have argued that the
Geneva Conventions are themselves customary law,I °° this Article draws a
distinction between codified war crimes01' and crimes against humanity as defined
and recognized by common law practices. 102
Although there is significant overlap between the coverage of war crimes law
and the law defining crimes against humanity, professor Aryeh Neier draws two
conceptual distinctions between the twin bodies of law 103 First, "crimes against
humanity" is a more encompassing concept because it takes into account crimes
committed during times of peace, while the concept of "war crimes" is limited to
acts committed "in times of armed conflict or occupation."' 04 At the same time, the
concept of "war crimes" is more encompassing because "it applies to even a single
crime committed in violation of the laws of war, regardless of whether that crime
was part of a widespread practice,"'10 5 whereas "crimes against humanity" requires
each act to be committed as part of a systematic or widespread practice and often
requires that the practice be motivated because of political, ethnic, or religious
reasons. 106
Though the prospect of bringing Kissinger to justice under one of the specific
human rights conventions or under the numerous war crimes conventions is
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
98. Id.
99. Supernor, supra note 96, at 218.
100. See generally Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Lmv, 81 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 348 (1987).
101. The issue of the Geneva Conventions and their applicability has been hotly debated recently
because of the United States military's treatment of captives from the war in Afghanistan. See Kenneth
Roth, Bush Policy Endangers American and Allied troops, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2002, at 7" see
also supra note 8, and accompanying text.
102. While this distinction is artificial and is used only for the purposes of bottling the concept of
crimes against humanity in this Article, it is useful to narrow the focus of the concept of crimes against
humanity. The risk of failing to make this distinction is the problem of unnecessary redundancy and
confusion. An act becomes a crime against humanity because it was also a war crime and thus part of
customary law. It is important to note, however, that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (2) (1986) defines customary law as "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from sense of legal obligation. It would appear from
this definition that all intemational agreements are a part of customary law, at least insofar as they are
actually "followed" in "general and consistent" manner.
103. "Crimes against humanity is simultaneously broader and a narrower concept than war
crimes." NEIER, supra note I, at 17
104. Id.
105. Id. However, some commentators believe that only "grave breaches" of war crimes statutes
are actually prosecuted and that perhaps this distinction is illusory. See Supemor, supra note 96, at 218.
106. NEIER, supra note 1, at 17
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intriguing, this Article will focus on crimes against humanity as defined by
customary law There is an additional reason for this limited focus besides the
inherent need to limit the scope of the discussion. Because Kissinger's actions and
their consequences for the people of East Timor are the focus of the factual
inquiry the doctrine of "crimes against humanity" appears to be a more promising
avenue to explore. A reason it is promising is the nature of the tragedy itself: a
massacre against a largely defenseless civilian population should not be
shoehorned into war crimes law by construing it as an armed conflict. From a
rhetorical and conceptual standpoint, assessing Kissinger's guilt under the rubnc of
"crimes against humanity" simply produces a better result. The extermination of
nearly a third of a nation's population is a crime against humanity and its
architects must be held to the utmost penalty and public scorn. 1
07
2. The Inherent Tension between International Law and National Sovereignty
The natural tension between international law and national sovereignty is
perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the area of human rights and criminal law
The notion that past or present national leaders could be brought up on charges,
real or imagined, in another country seems like a destabilizing proposition and one
fraught with possibilities for abuse. However, professor Diane Orentlicher stresses
that although states are given the first opportunity to try nationals within their own
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, the importance of punishing perpetrators
of crimes against humanity justifies extending permissive international jurisdiction
over them and "an exception to the bedrock principle of international law-respect
for national sovereignty "'0'
Indeed, this principle is recognized by the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States in section 702, which indicates that "[a] government may
be presumed to have encouraged or condoned acts [in violation of international
customary law] if such acts, especially by its officials, have been repeated or
notorious and no steps have been taken to prevent them or to punish the
perpetrators."' 1 9 Thus, a state has the duty to prosecute acts committed by its
officials or risk being in violation of customary international law itself.
Furthermore, international law affirmatively requires that states investigate
and prosecute crimes against humanity In 1973, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 3074, proclaiming the "[pirinciples of international
co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity ,,"i0 The first principle establishes that
"crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed, shall be subject to
107 This Article does not intend to imply that war crimes law or other specific human rights
conventions would not be a fruitful area of law to investigate if Kissinger were ever to be brought to
justice. It simply is outside the bounds of this Article to discuss the merits of such an investigation.
108. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2593.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702, supra note 89.
110. G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9326 (1973),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
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investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have
committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty
to punishment.""' While the second principle recognizes every state s right to try
its own nationals,' 12 principle five provides that where there is evidence that a
certain individual is guilty of crimes against humanity, that person "shall be
subject to trial and if found guilty to punishment."" 3 Thus, while states are given
the right of first refusal to try their own nationals, international law countenances
international jurisdiction where a state exercises that right despite contrary
evidence.' 4
Moreover, the justification for the very first prosecutions of crimes against
humanity at Nuremberg also supports the view that international jurisdiction is
permissible where necessary to prosecute grave human rights violations." l5 In those
cases, the innovation of crimes against humanity and prosecution of them was
justified on natural law grounds. The basic notion was that because crimes against
humanity inherently "offended humanity itself," the right to prosecute such crimes
on an international level, must also inherently exist." 6 Thus, a person who commits
crimes against humanity is "'an enemy of all mankind' - over whom any state
[can] assert criminal jurisdiction."' 
17
While the fear of international prosecution of crimes impinging on national
sovereignty is no doubt a real one, the procedural safeguards explicitly written into
international law should allay this fear. As long as a state follows the letter and
spirit of international law and brings to justice those whose crimes are sufficiently
supported by evidence, a state can assure itself that it has not broken international
law, and more importantly that its national sovereignty will be the utmost
respected.
3. Crimes Against Humanity
a. History
Following World War i, the Nuremberg tribunal was commenced for the
purposes of trying and punishing those Nazi officials responsible for the war itself
and the grave human rights catastrophe perpetrated prior to and during that
conflict. ' 8 These prosecutions "inaugurated the branch of international law
I 11. Id. at 79.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the word "shall" indicates the action is mandatory and not
permissive.
114. Compare id. ivuh THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001)
(supporting pure universal jurisdiction), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20,2003).
115. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2555-60.
116. Id. at 2556.
117. /d. at 2557
118. See generally id. at 2555-60. 2587-90, Opinion and Judgment of May 7. 1997 Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 618-23 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 1995), available at
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recognizing and protecting human rights."" 9 These prosecutions also gave rise to a
number of new and unique legal innovations, one of which was the recognition of
the concept of crimes against humanity 120 Since the Nuremberg prosecutions,
"crimes against humanity" as a legal doctrine has largely languished in the dustbin
of history and atrophied from disuse. 12 1 However, in recent years the doctrine has
been revived by the international criminal tribunals authorized by the United
Nations for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.122 Because the doctrine of "crimes against
humanity" is defined by customary international law, an examination of the
definitions used at Nuremberg and employed by the tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda is an expedient place to begin.
123
Crimes against humanity as defined by Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter, consisted of "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war;
or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."'' 24 Initially, a few
important issues are raised by this seemingly straightforward definition. First,
crimes against humanity as the Nuremberg Charter defines them, require a war
nexus.125 Although this was a relatively minor requirement during the Nuremberg
prosecutions because the world had recently emerged from the single largest
conflict in the history of mankind, this requirement has substantial implications,
not only for a possible prosecution of Henry Kissinger, but also for all subsequent
prosecutions. Because alleged crimes against humanity in recent times have largely
occurred in the context of internal civil disputes, an important question is whether
the Nuremberg tribunals properly considered the future impact of the war nexus
requirement. Moreover, regardless of the propriety of the nexus requirement at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/triaic2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
119. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2555. Critics of customary law as source of binding norms
openly admit that they believe that the Nuremberg trials were not justified by international law, but
amounted only to victors' justice. For example, Robert Bork asserts that the "pretense that customary
international law justified the [Nuremberg] trials and punishments was just that: a pretense. BORK,
supra note 89, at 18. For Bork, the trials at Nuremberg were nothing more than "victors
determin[ing] the 'law' retroactively. Id. at 20. "The only 'law' that is certain and knowable in
advance is that the victors will kill or impnson the leaders of the loser, writes Bork. Id. at 19.
120. NEIER, supra note i, at 16. However, Robert Bork believes "[ilt is somewhat nauseating to
hear of the law forbidding 'crimes against humanity" when it is obvious [to him] that what is involved
is not law but politicized force. BORK, supra note 89, at 29.
121. See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2559-60.
122. The international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda each maintain excellent
websites. The URLs are http://www.un.org/icty/ and http://www.ictr.orgl, respectively.
123. Customary international law is arguably molded and formed by each and every international
legal proceeding, or lack thereof. For example, John Hutson, dean of the Franklin Pierce Law Center,
recently wrote that the failure of the U.S. to afford the Guantanamo Bay detainees rights under the
Geneva Conventions, see supra note 1, was itself creating customary international law precedent. John
Hutson, Status Quo Is Not an Option, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 2004, at 38.
124. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, with Annexed Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, Art. 6(c), 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
125. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2589.
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Nuremberg, a more fundamental question is whether the requirement should
continue or be junked as ill considered in light of recent historical developments.'
26
The second major issue raised by the definition is the lack of a requirement
that the acts be committed because of race, religion, or for political reasons.
Although persecutions on the basis of these characteristics is one method of
proving crimes against humanity under the definition above, it is only one
alternative among many 127 However, while this was a non-issue at Nuremberg, it
has become particularly salient in the context of the international criminal tribunals
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.i
28
b. Recent Developments: Yugoslavia and Rwanda
29
In May of 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 827
establishing a criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and setting forth the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 30 Under the articles of the Statutes establishing the
Tribunal, the Tribunal is handed responsibility for prosecuting "serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991." '' The Tribunal is charged with investigating and
prosecuting individuals in the former Yugoslavia for "[girave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 ,,2 "[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war,
' 133
genocide, 134 and crimes against humanity i35
126. Id. This issue is further elaborated below. See infra notes 136-37, 147-49, and accompanying
text.
127. See Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 651.
128. This issue is further discussed below. See infra notes 149-50, and accompanying text.
129. The statutes of the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda are particularly helpful in attempting
to define the customary law underpinning crimes against humanity for several reasons. First, both
Statutes were enacted within the last decade, making them relevant to modem circumstances. Second,
because the doctrine of "crimes against humanity was largely ignored after the Nuremberg trials until
the Statutes for these two tribunals breathed new life into it, the Statutes for the tribunals are a natural
starting point for identifying any post-Nuremberg developments in the doctrine. Lastly, because each of
the tribunals have been active in applying the law to numerous defendants, substantial body of
jurisprudence has developed to give context to the Statutes and crimes contained therein.
130. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/827 (1993), amended
by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/I166 (1998), amended
further by S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000),
amended further by S. C. Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4535th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411
(2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia].
131. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, at Art. 1.
132. Id. at Art. 2. Article 2 lists several acts in particular that are enumerated as prohibited by the
Geneva Conventions. Some of the enumerated acts include: "(a) willful killing; (b) torture or inhumane
treatment [and] (h) taking civilians as hostages. Id at Art. 2(a)-2(h). For a brief description of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see supra notes 96-101, and accompanying text.
133. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 3. Like Article 2, Article 3
makes all violations of the laws of war actionable under the statutes but goes on to enumerate a few
examples. These include use of "poisonous weapons, the destruction and attack of undefended cities,
and "plunder of public or private property. Id. at Art. 3(a)-3(e).
134. Id. at Art. 4. The statutes require the acts enumerated under this article to be undertaken with
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In addition to proving one or more of the above delineated crimes, the
prosecutor is also required to prove "[i]ndividual criminal responsibility" pursuant
to Article 7 of the Statutes. 36 Article 7 specifically addresses the problem of
inferiors disclaiming responsibility because of their asserted lack of decision-
making control; 13 7 it also addresses the mirror image of this problem: namely the
responsibility of superiors for acts of subordinates.3 3 Article 7 also addresses the
issue of trying individuals who are government officials or heads of state. 
139
In all three cases, the Statutes of the Tribunal are liberal in casting the net of
criminal responsibility, holding subordinates liable for their acts regardless of
whether they were following orders from superiors, holding superiors liable for the
acts of their subordinates when they knew or had reason to know about the acts,
and eliminating the defense of immunity for government officials and heads of
state acting in their official capacities. In construing international law broadly
Article 7 of the Statutes of the Tribunal preemptively excludes most of the
"standard" defenses employed in criminal trials of military and political leaders.
In the Statutes' definition of crimes against humanity, the Tribunal is granted
the power and responsibility to prosecute individuals responsible for certain
enumerated acts "directed against any civilian population."1 40 The enumerated acts
are: "(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial, and
religious grounds; [and] (i) other inhumane acts."' 141 Comparing the definition in
the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia to the one employed at Nuremberg, it is
clear that the core of the doctrine of "crimes against humanity" has remained
"intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group Id. at Art. 4(2). Acts that evince
such intent include: "(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; [and] (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Id. at Art. 4(2)(a)-4(2)(e).
135. Id. at Art. 5.
136. Id. at Art. 7 Article 7 imposes criminal responsibility on any "person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime"
set forth in the foregoing articles. Id. at Art. 7(I).
137 Article 7 states: "[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government
or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if justice so requires. Id. at. Art. 7(4).
138. Article 7 holds superiors criminally responsible for acts of their subordinates where the
superior "knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof." Id. at Art. 7(3).
139. In one of the more groundbreaking sections of the statutes, Article 7 explains that "[t]he
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
Id. at Art. 7(2). This subsection to the article is invaluable precedent insofar as the prosecution of
Kissinger is concerned. This subsection specifically disallows the notion of immunity for acting or
former heads of state or high government officials for acts undertaken in their official capacities.
Following the letter and spirit of this precedent would render the defense that Kissinger was acting in
his official capacity a nonstarter.
140. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5.
141. Id. at Art. 5(a)-5(i).
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unchanged.
The differences, while minor, are important to recognize. First, the Statutes of
the Tribunal for Yugoslavia are more detailed in their enumeration of specific acts
that fall within the definition, including the acts contained in the Nuremberg
definition in addition to imprisonment, torture, and rape.' 42 Second, in addition to
proving the accused committed one or more of the enumerated acts, Article 5 of
the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia limits criminal liability to acts
"committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character." 143
This war nexus requirement is less burdensome than the stricter requirement at
Nuremberg in that it includes internal armed conflicts (or rather "civil conflicts")
within its reach. 44 However, it is important to note that the armed conflict nexus
requirement survived in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia in some lesser
form from the Nuremberg Charter's definition of "crimes against humanity"
In sum, the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia changed the core of
"crimes against humanity" jurisprudence very little from its inception at
Nuremberg. Although formulated nearly fifty years apart, the similarity between
the definitions lends credence to the notion that the doctrine of "crimes against
humanity" is customary law The fact that after half a century the same underlying
wrongs are considered to be so grave as to warrant an international response
bolsters the argument that these prohibitions are universally recognized and nearly
timeless in their application. The definition of "crimes against humanity" in the
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda lends further credence
to the continuity and universality of the doctrine.
In November of 1994, the U.N. Security Council followed its own lead and
passed Resolution 955 establishing a tribunal for Rwanda. 14' After years of violent
civil war and accusations of gross human rights violations, 146 the Security Council
142. Id. at Art. 5. Cf Nuremberg Charter, supra note 124, at Art. 6(c).
143. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5.
144. The necessity of loosening this requirement in the context of the Yugoslavian conflict is
evident. Because the armed conflict occurred within the borders of the former state of Yugoslavia, the
Tribunal would have had no power if the Statutes had propounded war nexus requirement similar to
that imposed at Nuremberg. See supra notes 119-20, and accompanying text. Moreover, had the conflict
significantly spilled into neighboring states, it is still doubtful that such conflict would have risen to
the level of intemational armed conflict. See Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2589-90 (discussing the
ambiguity of the war nexus requirement under the Nuremberg Charter, and detailing how the war nexus
requirement could be viewed either as "an element of crimes against humanity" or "merely limitation
on [the Tribunal's] jurisdiction"); infra notes 150-51, and accompanying text.
145. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), amended
by S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3504th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/978 (1995), amended further
by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I165 (1998), amended
further by S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda]. Like the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the Statutes of the
Tribunal for Rwanda are appended to this Security Council resolution, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
146. See, e.g., Bruce W. Nelan, A Recurring Nightmare; The Bloodletting Between Hutu and Tutst
Now Threatens to Erupt Across the Border from Rwanda, TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 50.
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finally sought to bring the alleged perpetrators of the acts to justice. Like the
Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Article I of the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Rwanda sets forth the Tribunal's primary jurisdiction: "[tihe International Tribunal
for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda." 147 The
Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda also followed the same basic structure with
regard to delimiting the crimes the Tribunal had authority to investigate and
prosecute. The Statutes authorized the Tribunal to prosecute genocide, 148 crimes
against humanity, 149 and "violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol l1.'i15 The Statutes of the Tribunal for
Rwanda also contain an article explicating when individual criminal responsibility
can be assigned that closely tracks Article 7 of the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Yugoslavia.i 5i
Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda defines the Tribunal's
power to prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity The Article states that
"[tihe International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic,
racial, or religious grounds." iS 2 The enumerated acts that qualify under this Article
are precisely identical to those listed under Article 5 of the Statutes of the Tribunal
for Yugoslavia, 53 namely- "(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d)
deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political,
racial, and religious grounds; [and] (i) other inhumane acts."
'iS4
Comparing the definitions of "crimes against humanity" employed by the
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a few important distinctions can be drawn.
The first is the substitution of the phrase "as part of a widespread or systematic
147 Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. I. Article I limits the scope of the
Tribunal's investigation to acts that occurred during the 1994 calendar year. Id. Cf. Statutes of the
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. I (granting the Tribunal for Yugoslavia the power to
prosecute all acts committed "since 1991").
148. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 2. Article 2 tracks, nearly word
for word, Article 4 of the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130.
149 Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3.
150. Id. at Art. 4. Article 4 gives the Tribunal the authority to prosecute "persons committing or
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977
Id. Article 4 goes on to list several of these violations, including "violence to life" (murder and torture),
hostage taking, terrorism, rape, and pillage. Id. at Art. 4(a)-4(h). See Geneva Conventions of 1949,
supra notes 96-97, and accompanying text; see also Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra notes
132-33, at Art. 2-3 (defining war crimes slightly differently and enumerating a different list of acts).
151. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 6; see also Statutes of the Tribunal
for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 7 supra notes 136-39, and accompanying text. The only difference
between the two articles is the inclusion of feminine pronouns, to match the masculine pronouns, in the
Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda. See supra note 137
152. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3; see also Statutes of the
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 5; supra notes 132-36, and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 141, and accompanying text.
154. Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3(a)-3(i).
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attack" in the latter for the phrase "in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character" in the former. 55 This substitution is a very important
difference because it affects the underlying facts that the prosecutor is required to
prove to find the defendant guilty While the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Yugoslavia retain a vestige of the war nexus requirement from the Nuremberg
Charter, 156 the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda expressly disclaim this
requirement. However, while the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda drop the war
nexus requirement, they simultaneously add the requirement that the attack occur
"on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. ' I' 57 This strict
requirement is entirely absent from the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia and
the Nuremberg Charter.158
Comparing the three definitions of crimes against humanity from the
Nuremberg Charter and the Statutes of the Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
it is clear that there is a basic agreement about the fundamental contours of the law,
namely the acts that constitute the crime. Although the acts that can give rise to
prosecution for crimes against humanity have been expanded since Nuremberg, the
core of the law-that "massive atrocities against persecuted groups" will not be
tolerated-remains unchanged. 59 However, while the basic tenets of the law have
held steady two important peripheral issues arose after Nuremberg: whether the
doctrine of "crimes against humanity" should contain a war nexus requirement,
and whether it should contain a requirement that the acts be motivated by the
racial, religious, or political status of the persecuted group.
c. The Law Applied: Elements of the Crime
In 1995, Dusko Tadic became the first person charged with crimes against
humanity since the Nuremberg trials, a span of fifty years. 6° A Serb prison guard
known as "the Butcher of PrUedor, Tadic was charged with a litany of atrocious
human rights violations. 16 1 The case generated judicial opinions that gave context
155. Compare Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3 with Statutes of the
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 5.
156. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 124, at Art. 6(c); supra note 125, and accompanying text.
157 Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3
158. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, Art. 5; Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 124, at Art. 6(c).
159. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2595.
160. Ed Vulliamy, In Times of Trial, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 31, 1995, at T6.
161. Id. Ed Vulliamy of The Guardian sums up the factual allegations against Tadic:
When the hurricane of violence came, Tadic was in the eye of the storm.
Tadic, say the indictment and papers, visited Omarska [a prison camp] daily (or nightly),
usually in military fatigues. He tortured, raped and beat prisoners in sessions involving
'truncheons, iron bars, rifle butts, wire cables and knives' The indictment has him
jumping on prisoners' backs and, as their unconscious bodies were taken away in
wheelbarrows, emptying fire extinguisher in one of their mouths. Prisoners were forced
to perform oral sex on each other; many were never seen again and there are six named
murder victims on the indictment. According to background papers, three were killed
with metal rods and knives, whereupon a fourth was forced to bite off their testicles.
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to the crimes listed in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia162 and in
particular, explained the legal elements necessary to hold an individual guilty of
crimes against humanity under the definition set forth in those Statutes.
63
The Trial Chamber I1, with respect to crimes against humanity first noted that
the Statutes require the prosecutor to prove both that the defendant committed one
or more of the crimes charged in Article 5 (defining crimes against humanity)
164
and that the defendant was individually responsible under Article 7 paragraph .1,6
The Trial Chamber I1 then exhaustively examined the elements of Article 5 of the
Statutes, preferring to address the Article 7 issues for all of the charges, including
the Article 2 (Geneva Convention)' 66 and Article 3 (war crimes) 67 charges, in a
separate section. 168
Briefly, a few important points about crimes against humanity at least insofar
as they are defined by the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, can be culled
from the various opinions in the Tadic case.
i. The War Nexus Requirement
First, although a war nexus requirement is present in the Statutes, the
requirement goes against the modem trend and is perhaps ill considered. The
"when in armed conflict" requirement, 69 as defined by the Appeals Chamber on an
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic case, 170 requires "a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."'1
7'
In defining the nexus required between the act and the armed conflict, the Appeals
Chamber held: "[i]t is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the
hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the
conflict."'172 However, as the Trial Chamber II observed, the requirement "deviates
Id., see also Amended Indictment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/tad-2ai951214e.htm
(last visited Nov. 24, 2003). Tadic was found guilty of I I of the 31 counts listed in the indictment. For
brief accounting of the charges of which he was found guilty and innocent, see Press Release, Tadic
Case: The Verdict (May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/pl90-e.htm (last visited
Nov. 24, 2003)..
162. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic.
163. Id. at 557-76, 618-92.
164. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5.
165. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 625; see also supra note 136,
and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 132, and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 133, and accompanying text.
168. Opinion and Judgment of May 7 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 661-92.
169 Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5; see also supra notes 135-36,
and accompanying text.
170. Decision of Oct. 2, 1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at 70 (int'l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2003); see also supra note 144, and accompanying text.
171. Decision of Oct. 2, 1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at 70.
172. Id.
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from the development of the doctrine after the [Nuremberg] Charter" and is
completely omitted from the definition of crimes against humanity in the Statutes
of the Tribunal for Rwanda.17 Despite the explicit war nexus requirement in the
Statutes, the Appeals Chamber noted that "[ilt is by now a settled rule of
customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a
connection to international armed conflict."'1
74
Examining the war nexus requirement from the perspective of its implications
for future trials, it is arguable that the requirement is outmoded and unfit for future
prosecutions of crimes against humanity In fact, under certain circumstances,
application of the requirement would seem to produce paradoxical results. For
example, for the requirement set forth by the Appeals Chamber to be satisfied,
there must be either the use of "armed force between States or protracted armed
violence" between groups within a State. 75 Therefore, to satisfy this requirement,
any group which is being murdered, enslaved, or tortured176 must acquire and use
weapons against their attackers in order to be protected by international law
However, if the persecuted population has no means of escalating the incident to
the level of "armed conflict, then the perpetrators of grave human rights
violations appear to be off the hook. This paradoxical result certainly cannot be
what was intended when the law of crimes against humanity was first
conceptualized.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Statutes of the Tribunal for
Rwanda specifically exclude this requirement 77 and the realization that such a
requirement, as interpreted by the Appeals Court in the Tadic case, could possibly
exclude from coverage the twenty-five year long "skirmish" between Indonesian
soldiers and the entire East Timorese population.' 78 While this issue is further
discussed below, 179 it is enough to say here that because East Timor was not an
officially recognized state at the time and yet not necessarily an Indonesian
territory (with the status of Portugal as colonial power in flux), this struggle may
not have achieved the sacred status of "armed conflict" under a strict interpretation
of the Appeals Chamber's definition. 180
173. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 627" see also supra notes
147-48, and accompanying text.
174. Decision of Oct. 2, 1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 141. The Appeals Chamber was
nevertheless compelled to require the nexus to armed conflict be proved since the Security Council,
aware of the absence of the requirement under modem conceptions of customary law, explicitly
required the nexus in the Statutes.
175. Id. at 70.
176. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5; see also supra note 133, and
accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 147-48, and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 45, and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 213-18, and accompanying text.
180. Compare supra notes 46-47, 52-53, 59-62, and accompanying text with Decision of Oct. 2,
1995, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 70; see also supra note 175, and accompanying text.
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it. The Directed Against a Civilian Population Requirement
The second major issue raised by the Tadic case was the meaning of the
"directed against a civilian population" requirement.'' Although the requirement
may on face seem simple to apply it actually has three independent elements, each
of which must be addressed and satisfied. 182 The first sub-element is the
requirement that the persecuted population be "civilian" in nature. The conclusion
that can be drawn from the Trial Chamber Il's opinions in the Tadic case is that the
term "civilian" is to be construed broadly and should not be a difficult hurdle for
the prosecutor The Trial Chamber 11, borrowing from precedent, held that "a wide
definition of civilian population is justified" and that "the presence of those
actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization of a
population as civilian."'
' 83
The second sub-element to be satisfied is the requirement that the attack be
against a civilian population. The Trial Chamber II noted in the Tadic case that the
term is meant,
"to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts
which do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity." 84 However, as the
Trial Chamber If also noted, this definition implies a number of independent
issues that must be resolved: "the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic
basis, there must be some form of a governmental, organizational or group
policy to commit these acts and the perpetrator must know of the context
within which his actions are taken, [and] the actions [must] be taken on
discriminatory grounds."1
85
The Trial Chamber II held that the first requirement "can be fulfilled if the
acts occur on either a widespread basis or in a systematic manner." i 6 It Is
interesting to note that reading this requirement into the term "population" actually
renders the definition of crimes against humanity in the Statute of the Tribunal for
Rwanda redundant in part. 87 As is mentioned above, 8 8 the definition of "crimes
against humanity" in the Rwandan Statutes replaces the war nexus requirement
181. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 5: see also supra note 140, and
accompanying text.
182. Opinion and Judgment of May 7 1997 Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 635.
183. Id. at 643 (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 644 (internal citation omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). Later the chamber refined the definition and explained the
policy behind the requirement:
It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the notion of crimes
against humanity that led to the inclusion of the requirement that the acts must be
directed against civilian "population, and either a finding of widespreadness, which
refers to the number of victims, or systematicity, indicating that pattern or methodical
plan is evident, fulfils this requirement.
Id. at 648.
187. See Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3.
188. See supra note 147, and accompanying text.
2003
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
with the requirement that the crimes be "committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack" but otherwise retains the language of the Statutes of the
Tribunals for Yugoslavia, including the "civilian population" language. 8 9 Thus,
reading a "widespread or systematic" requirement into the term "population"
renders the identical language in the Rwandan Statutes redundant.
For the second requirement, that there must be a policy of some kind, the
Trial Chamber 11 held that "such a policy need not be formalized and can be
deduced from the way in which the acts occur." 190 Circumstantial evidence of a
policy includes showing the acts occurred "on a widespread or systematic basis
that demonstrate[d] a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not."' 9'
Therefore, meeting the above requirement of being widespread or systematic
appears to create a presumption that the acts were taken pursuant to a policy 192
The third requirement read into the term "population" by the Trial Chamber 11
in the Tadic case is that the prosecutor must prove "discriminatory intent on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."'193 Even though the
discriminatory intent requirement was expressly absent from the statutory
language, the Trial Chamber 11, relying in part on statements by Security Council
members, concluded that the requirement should nonetheless be read into the
Statutes. 94 As the chamber noted, the discriminatory intent requirement was
explicitly included in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda.' 95
iii. Mens Rea: The Intent Nexus Requirement
The third major issue raised by the Tadic case was the requirement that "the
act not be unrelated to the armed conflict."' 196 As the Trial Chamber II noted,
this requirement involves a two-step analysis. First, the defendant's act must occur
"within the context of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population."'197 Second, "the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict."' 98 "Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either
189. See Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3.
190. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 653.
191. Id.
192. An additional issue under this requirement is whether or not the "policy" at issue must be
state policy. Drawing on American case law from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Trial
Chamber 11 held that "although policy must exist to commit these acts, it need not be the policy of a
State. Id. at 655 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
193. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 652.
194. id.
195. Id., see also Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 145, at Art. 3; supra notes 149-
50, and accompanying text
196. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997 Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 656.
197. Id., see also supra notes 176-78, and accompanying text. The Trial Chamber I1 held that "in
addition to the intent to commit the underlying offence the perpetrator must know of the broader
context in which his act occurs. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 656;
see also Judgment and Sentence of June 1, 2000, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-1 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Rawanda 2000), available at 39 INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 1338, 1340-41 (2000).
198. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 656. As for this second
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actual or constructive, that these acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic
basis and does not commit his act for purely personal motives completely unrelated
to the attack on the civilian population, then the intent nexus requirement has
been satisfied. i99
iv. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
2
1
The last requirement to be proved is individual criminal responsibility as set
forth in Article 7 of the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia.2' This
requirement involves a three-step inquiry 202 First, the prosecutor must show
intent, "which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a
conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or
otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime.20 3 Second, the
prosecutor is required to prove the defendant either directly participated or that the
conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of the illegal act." 20 4 Finally
the prosecutor must show the requisite "amount of assistance before one can be
held culpable for involvement in a crime."205
As for the requirement that the prosecutor prove intent, the Trial Chamber II
noted that precedent supported the conclusion that "knowledge and intent can be
inferred from the circumstances." 2° It also held that "[a]lthough intent founded on
inherent knowledge, proved or inferred, is required for a finding of guilt, the Trial
Chamber need not find that there was a pre-arranged plan, to which the accused
was a party, to engage in any specific conduct."
20 7
For the second step of the inquiry, the requirement of "direct contribution,"
the Trial Chamber II summarized the case law and drew three general conclusions
about the requirement: "direct contribution does not necessarily require the
participation in the physical commission of the illegal act," 20
8 "participation in the
commission of the crime does not require an actual physical presence or physical
assistance," 209 and "mere presence at the scene of the crime without intent is not
requirement, the Trial Chamber Ii noted "that the act cannot be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict, [and] while personal motives may be present they should not be the sole
motivation for the act. Id. at 658.
199. Id. at 659.
200. It is important to emphasize that the Trial Chamber II addressed the Article 7 requirements for
all of the charges, including charges under Article 2 (violations of the Geneva Conventions), Article 3
(war crimes) and Article 4 (genocide), in a single section. See supra notes 156-60, and accompanying
text.
201. Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, supra note 130, at Art. 7; see also supra notes 136,
153, 165, and accompanying text.
202. Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 674.
203. Id.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 681.
206. Id. at 676.
207. Id. at 677
208. Id. at 679.
209. Id.
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enough.,21°
For the final step, determining whether the particular defendant rendered
enough assistance so as to justify culpability, the Trial Chamber II specifically
refused to line-draw, instead preferring to examine whether the necessary amount
of participation had been proved on a case-by-case basis. 211 While no bright-line
rules were proffered, a few general conclusions can be drawn from the cases the
Trial Chamber 11 reviewed in its opinion. Briefly, acts sufficient to meet the
threshold include providing material support212 and failing to prevent others from
acting. 213 The Trial Chamber I1 also recognized that "not only does one not have to
be present but the connection between the act contributing to the commission and
the act of commission itself can be geographically and temporally distanced. '2 1n
d. A Brief Note on Statutes of Limitation and Crimes Against Humanity
Since 1968, a U.N. convention has provided that crimes against humanity are
not subject to any statute of limitations. 21 5 As a result, "[a] trial could take place
twenty or thirty or forty years later., 21 6 This principle disallows those guilty of the
most heinous human rights violations to hide behind the shield of time. As
professor Aryeh Neier notes, the principle has been used to try more than 7,000
former Nazi officials in Germany since 1950.217 The policy behind the principle is
also sound. The notion that a person guilty of the most heinous human rights
violations should go free on a technicality is preposterous. As a normative matter,
a defendant should not escape punishment merely because the community of
nations has been laggard in bringing him or her before a tribunal.21 i
The preceding brief examination of the law of crimes against humanity was
intended to leave the reader with the notion that it is not simple to convict a
defendant under the law. Therefore, when a grossly incomplete factual record more
210. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Trial Chamber 11 discussed the In re Tesch case in which
two businessmen were tried for war crimes for supplying Zyklon B gas to the Auschwitz concentration
camp during World War II. The two men were found guilty of "supplying the means" ofextermination
with knowledge "that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings [, specifically
allied nationals]. In re Tesch (Zyklon B case), 13 Ann. Dig. 250, 252 (British Military Ct. 1946).
211. Opinion and Judgment of May 7 1997, Prosecutor v. Tadic, at 681.
212. See id at 684.
213. Id. at 686.
214. Id. at 687 A related issue is whether one act alone is sufficient for the purposes of "crimes
against humanity jurisprudence. The Trial Chambers II addressed this issue and concluded that "a
single act by perpetrator taken within the context of widespread or systematic attack against
civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual perpetrator need not
commit numerous offences to be held liable. Id. at. 649.
215. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969), reproduced from G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR,
23rd Sess., 1727th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2391 (1968).
216. NEIER, supra note I, at 249.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 212-13. A statute of limitations not only benefits the criminal defendant, it also
provides politically expedient excuse for states that refuse their treaty obligations and moral
responsibility by failing to bring massive violators of human rights to justice.
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or less satisfies the requirements, one can be sure that the alleged perpetrator
deserves further scrutiny
B. Applying the Law" Crimes Against East Timor as Crimes Against Humanity
For purposes of examining the strength of the case against Henry Kissinger, it
is useful to examine the known facts2 19 against the backdrop of the law of "crimes
against humanity" as it is explicated in the various opinions generated by the Tadic
case. Since the preceding examination focused upon them and it is arguable they
represent customary international law as well as any other model, the hypothetical
"crimes against humanity" statutes to be applied here will be the same as those
found in the Statutes of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia.220
I Indonesia, East Timor, and the War Nexus Requirement
Notwithstanding whether the war nexus requirement should, as a normative
matter, be a requirement for proving a violation of the law of "crimes against
humanity, it is arguable that the conflict between East Timor and Indonesia would
have satisfied the requirement nonetheless. It requires the use of armed force
between states or between organized groups and governmental authorities within a
state.221 First, it could be said that East Timor was an independent state at the time,
regardless of international recognition, for several reasons. For instance, East
Timor's colonial ruler, Portugal, supported independence for the tiny island
nation 222 and a majority of the East Timor's population appeared to support
independence as well. 23 In the alternative, it could be argued that the East
Timorese coalition supporting independence was an "organized group" within
Indonesia at the time of the armed conflict.2 24 Under either interpretation, the war
nexus requirement would be satisfied.
However, the more important question is whether the war nexus requirement
should be an element of "crimes against humanity" law as a matter of good policy
As was argued above,225 given the possibility that such a requirement could
produce a paradoxical result and a severe miscarriage of justice, the better course
seems to be that taken by the Statutes of the Tribunal for Rwanda, which do not
require the nexus to war.
226
219. It is worth reiterating that the U.S. government is still withholding majority of the most
probative evidence. See supra Section I.C.2.
220. Whether Kissinger's actions appropriately satisfly the required legal elements under the
Statutes will also be discussed. See infra Section II.B. i-ii.B.4.
221. See supra note 171, and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 47-44, and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 55-58, and accompanying text.
224. See id.
225. See supra notes 168-72, and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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2. Directed Against A Civilian Population: Indonesian Attacks Against East
Timor
Since there is little doubt that many of the casualties during Indonesia's three
decade long siege of East Timor were civilians and because the bar is set
deliberately low, this element appears to be satisfied.227
The three issues arising under the "population" element also seem to be
resolved in favor of culpability As for the first requirement that the acts be either
systematic or widespread, the killing of nearly a full third of the entire population
of East Timor, a sixth in the first year alone, seems to indicate the acts were both
widespread and systematic. 228 The next requirement, a two-prong test demanding
(1) evidence that the acts occurred pursuant to a policy and (2) a showing that the
defendant knew the context within which he or she took the actions, is also easily
satisfied by the available factual record 229 First, there appears to be a presumption
that this element is satisfied when the widepread or systematic requirement is
satisfied,23 ° which it appears to be, and second, the acts were taken pursuant to a
plan devised by General Suharto and known to Kissinger.2 3 ' The final requirement,
proof of discriminatory intent, can be shown by a number of statements from both
Suharto and Kissinger with respect to the political affiliations of the East Timor
population.
2 32
A brief note about the "fighting communism" defense is in order at this
juncture. Although the laws defining "crimes against humanity" do not
countenance such a defense, some critics may argue that Kissinger was simply
following the politically prudent course of action given the context of the Cold
War. This argument, however, misses the core of the definition of crimes against
humanity which encompasses all persecutions based on political affiliation. 233 It
also misconstrues the facts of the case. At no point did Suharto ever claim that
227. Compare supra note 39, and accompanying text and supra note 41, and accompanying text
with supra note 183, and accompanying text.
228. Compare supra notes 44-45, and accompanying text with supra note 186, and accompanying
text.
229. See supra notes 190-88, and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 192, and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., supra note 59, and accompanying text; supra note 71 (discussing how Kissinger and
Ford were aware Suharto was hedging in the direction of invading East Timor as many as five months
before the invasion); supra note 78, and accompanying text (revealing conversation between
Kissinger, Ford, and Suharto in which Suharto announced his plans to invade East Timor the day prior
to the invasion).
232. See, e.g., supra note 71 (showing that Suharto's spoken motive for invading East Timor was
Fretilin's supposed links to communism); supra note 78, and accompanying text (in which Suharto
again mentions Fretilin's supposed communist links as reason justifying the invasion); supra notes
84-85, and accompanying text (in which Kissinger justifies selling arms to Indonesia because East
Timor is "Communist government").
233. See supra note 193, and accompanying text.
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Indonesia's invasion was aimed at defending his country from an attack by East
Timor, and, notwithstanding Kissinger's comments to the contrary,234 such a claim
would be fanciful given the severe disparity in military capabilities between East
Timor and Indonesia. Lastly, since the State Department's own internal documents
called Fretilin "vaguely leftist, '235 the massacre of 200,000 people on the off
chance that they were attempting to spread "communist instability" seems
preposterous.
3. Intent Nexus Requirement: Supplying Weapons to a Murderous Regime
This element, as construed by the Trial Chamber I1 in the Tadic case, requires
the actor have either actual or constructive knowledge of the widespread or
systematic nature of the attacks and a purpose to contribute to these attacks.236
Showing Henry Kissinger was aware of the widespread and systematic nature of
the Indonesian attacks on East Timor is unproblematic given the extensive
intelligence information he was privy to in his multiple positions of power.237 As
for the second requirement, all that need be shown is that personal motives alone
did not trigger the act.238 This requirement can be readily shown from Kissinger's
and Ford's statements to Suharto on the day prior to the invasion, in which
Kissinger and Ford offered to support Suharto's planned invasion in no uncertain
terms. 239 It is also evidenced by statements Kissinger made to his underlings in a
State Department meeting in which Kissinger openly acknowledged flouting
240United States law to assist the Indonesians. Interestingly, Kissinger's own words
show that personal motives were not behind his decision to continue the flow of
weapons to Indonesia. At another point in the same State Department meeting,
Kissinger, while discussing the weapons sales to Indonesia, told the other State
Department officials present that he got "nothing from" the sales, he received "no
rakeoff" from them.24'
234. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text (revealing that Kissinger intended to play the
"fighting communism" card if Congress decided to hold hearings on East Timor).
235. See Briefing Paper' Indonesia and Portuguese Timor supra note 49.
236. See supra notes 188-91, and accompanying text.
237. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also supra note 23 1.
238. See supra note 198, and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., supra note 78, and accompanying text (in the repnnted transcript of the meeting
between Suharto, Ford, and Kissinger, Kissinger assures Suharto that he and the administration will
favorably "influence the reaction in America" to the imminent Indonesian invasion of East Timor).
240. See, e.g., supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text (in the reprinted Memorandum of
Conversation of State Department meeting eleven days after the invasion, Kissinger chides his aides
for allowing lower ranking State Department officials to go against his wishes and recommend
suspension of arms to Indonesia).
241. Id; see also HITCHENS, supra note 15, at 106. Admittedly the claim is quite suspicious given
that the accusation was never made. Echoing the sentiments of Queen Gertrude in Hamlet, Kissinger
"doth protest too much, methinks. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2, line 240.
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4. Individual Criminal Responsibility- Aiding and Abetting Suharto
As discussed above, satisfying this element involves a three-step inquiry 242
The initial step is a showing of knowledge of participation and intent to actively
participate, and this step can be inferred from nearly all of Kissinger's acts with
respect to the invasion of East Timor. First, it is clear Kissinger knew the context
within which he was acting.243 It appears equally clear that Kissinger intended to
actively aid Suharto, with moral support and weapons, in carrying out the
invasion. 244 For example, he participated by squelching attempts by lower ranking
State Department officials to halt arms transfers to Indonesia, 245 by failing to object
to Suharto's announced plans even though he knew his objection would have likely
scuttled the plans entirely 246 and by attempting to deceive Congress about the
matter in order to continue arms shipments to Indonesia.247
As for the second inquiry requiring a showing of direct contribution, the
above-mentioned facts fulfill it as well. More specific evidence of substantial
direct contribution is the fact that, rather than halting as they should have, U.S.
weapons sales doubled after the invasion in the face of Indonesia's known
weapons shortage. 248 Evidence of direct participation in the actual murder of the
East Timorese, while tenuous without the best evidence, can still be shown by the
fact that weapons sold to Indonesia after the invasion (and thus after the weapons
sales should have been halted) were likely used in the invasion of East Timor.249
As for the third inquiry asking whether the actor rendered the requisite
amount of assistance, several already cited facts appear to satisfy it. As the Trial
Chamber 11 concluded in the Tadic case, providing material support and failing to
prevent others from acting satisfies the threshold. 250 Kissinger not only provided
material support in the form of weapons, but he also failed to object to the invasion
when he knew doing so would have likely prevented it.
Thus, without great difficulty it seems clear that the body of facts
surrounding Kissinger's involvement in the invasion of East Timor can be mapped
onto the law defining crimes against humanity While some of the edges are rough
and the fit may not be precise, there is no doubt a colorable claim to be made, and
one that the remaining concealed evidence would no doubt shed great light upon.
242. See supra Section II.A.3.c.iv.
243. See supra note 23 1.
244. Remember, Kissinger described halt of weapons sales to Indonesia, which he was firmly
against, as "kick[ing] the Indonesians in the teeth. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text.
245. Compare supra notes 83-85, and accompanying text with supra notes 198-99, and
accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 79, 81.
247. See supra notes 83-84, and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 81; supra note 60, and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 74, and accompanying text; see also supra note 78, and accompanying text.
Remember that the Trial Chamber II in the Tadic case construed the "direct contribution" inquiry to not
require participation in the physical commission of the act or physical assistance in the act. See supra
notes 208-02; see also In re Tesch (Zyklon B Case), 13 Ann. Dig. 250, 252 (British Military Ct. 1946).
250. See supra notes 212-06, and accompanying text.
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Although this author holds no illusions about Kissinger actually standing trial for
crimes against humanity, the law and facts in many ways speak for themselves. It
is a hotly contested conclusion, as would be expected, and it engenders a debate
filled with unspoken assumptions and unconscious biases.
SECTION III: THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FAILURE TO HOLD KISSINGER
ACCOUNTABLE
[E]very society, including ours, manages to function with only the most
precarious purchase on the truth of its own past. Every society has a substantial
psychological investment in its heroes. To discover that its heroes were guilty of
war crimes is to admit that the identities they defended were themselves tarnished.
Which is why a society is often so reluctant to surrender its own to war crimes
tribunals, why it is so vehemently "in denial" about facts evident to everyone
outside the society. War crimes challenge collective moral identities, and when
these identities are threatened, denial is actually a defense of everything one holds
dear
Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior s Honor
251
A. Failing to Hold Kissinger Accountable Represents a Clear Double Standard
Despite the compelling evidence and precedent to the contrary, a sober review
of the current state of world affairs reveals that Henry Kissinger will never face
criminal prosecution for his alleged misdeeds, much less prosecution under
international law.252 Although the crimes of Kissinger and Pinochet are intimately
linked and the facts appear to support prosecutions of both,253 there is a major
difference between the crimes of the two men. One committed them under the
protection of the most powerful country in the world; the other did not. It is highly
unlikely any country or bloc of countries would attempt to prosecute Kissinger, or
any former U.S. official, for crimes against humanity "for fear of economic and
political reprisals" or worse.254 The basic lesson to be learned from these cold, hard
truths is that there is a blatant double standard in the prosecution of international
criminals, "where powerful states may judge the leaders and former leaders of less
251. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR 184 (1997).
252. See generally Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral Dilemmas About Trying Pinochet in Spain, 32
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV 1, 2-3 (2001) (discussing the remote possibility of trying United States
politicians like Kissinger because of the inequality of power in the nation-state system); see also BORK,
supra note 89, at 29-30 ("The degree of danger officials face will depend on the power and influence of
their countries.").
253. See Shahram Seyedin-Noor, The Spanish Prisoner" Understanding the Prosecution of Senator
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 88-90 (2000); White, supra note 3 i, at
224-25; supra notes 31-32, and accompanying text.
254. Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of International
Customary Law: The US. Bombardment of Laos and Cambodia, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 429,
474-75 (2001).
2003
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
powerful states for crimes against humanity but not vice versa., 255 However,
while many commentators simply accept the double standard as a given, an
examination of the causes underlying the phenomenon is warranted. More
importantly, because the American public's acquiescence allows the double
standard to persist, any examination must ultimately probe the public conscience
on this matter.256
I The "Politics" of Holding Kissinger Accountable
For a prime example of the power of language manipulation, one need look
no further than the debate over whether to hold U.S. actors criminally liable for
their actions. Official U.S. denouncements of efforts to bring former U.S. leaders
to justice often take the form of turning the tables and accusing the investigation of
being "'political' rather than legal. 257 Of course this complaint is the exact same
complaint as critics of the failure to bring Kissinger and others to justice have
against the U.S.
258
As attorney Shahram Seyedin-Noor explains, "[t]he decision to prosecute
Pinochet over Kissinger or other officials in the West that at times helped
orchestrate his atrocities is even more 'political' than the decision to prosecute
Pinochet alone, since it manifests judgment on 'worthy' and 'unworthy'
criminals. '259 Seyedin-Noor concludes, "[t]he current liberal agenda of human
rights activists to prosecute 'dictators' must then be understood to function within
the restrictive framework of the politically 'acceptable.' 260 Thus, it is the decision
to decline to try Kissinger and those similarly situated that is "political" and
opposed to "legal.
Of course, this argument also flies in the face of the conclusions of fact and
law drawn above. A decision to prosecute Kissinger, given the weight of the
evidence heretofore gathered and the current state of customary international law,
255. White, supra note 31, at 225.
256. That the American public's support is a lynchpin for the continued vitality of the double
standard may be demonstrated by way of example. While it should be beyond dispute that majority of
the American public would never countenance a trial for Henry Kissinger under any circumstances, the
public has no such reservations when it comes to other ruthless leaders. In December 2003, following
the capture of Saddam Hussein by American forces, ninety-six percent of Americans said they believed
Hussein should be put on trial. Deborah L. Acomb, Poll Track, NAT'L J., Dec. 20, 2003. A full seventy-
two percent believed he should be tred by an international court or the U.S. military. Id Notably, it
does not appear that Robert Bork has publicly objected to such a trial.
257 Barrett, supra note 254, at 474. Typifying this sentiment, attorney Jamison G. White writes,
with respect to the prospect of establishing permanent International Criminal Court and prosecuting
U.S. officials in it, that such prosecutions would represent "vendetta-driven type ofjustice. Jamison
G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a
Wake-up Call for Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W RES. L. REV. 127, 175 (1999). Echoing that
sentiment, Robert Bork writes that "[i]ntemational law is not law but politics. BORK, supra note 89, at
21.
258. See Barrett, supra note 254, at 474; Goti, supra note 252.
259. See Seyedin-Noor, supra note 253, at 88-89.
260. Id. at 90-91.
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at least with regard to the law of crimes against humanity, appears far from
political. In fact, since such a decision would appear to be justified by an objective
review of the law and facts, it is the continued failure to bring Kissinger before a
tribunal that appears to be "political. A cursory review of the evidence with
respect to Kissinger's crimes in East Timor shows a total lack of contrary evidence
or alternate explanation. And it is again worth noting that the best evidence is still
under lock and key The United States may well continue to stonewall
investigations and prosecutions of its own officials; what is unacceptable, however,
is the claim that such prosecutions are merely "political" warfare.
2. Narcissistic Patriotism
The quotation opening this section addresses the dirty little secret of
international human rights law- that the "national objectivity" necessary to carry
out the system of international justice is quite possibly nothing more than illusory
Every society, like every individual within that society has a vested interest in
assuring that its "heroes" remain untarnished. The health of the collective psyche
of every society indeed depends heavily upon the continued myth of its country
and its leaders. 261 Because the stakes are so very high, the populations in most
nations, including the U.S., are reluctant to even consider the possibility that their
current and former leaders are international criminals.262
In The Warriors Honor professor Michael Ignatieff discusses the various
"forms of denial" that societies undertake to rationalize their failure to punish
international criminals in their midst.263 One such rationalization strategy and one
which appears to be actively at play in the case of Kissinger, is the "outright
refusal to accept facts as facts.,,264 As Ignatieff explains, "[r]esistance to historical
truth is a function of group identity" nations and peoples weave their sense of
themselves into narcissistic narratives that strenuously resist correction."2 65 While
such a rationalization process can quite clearly be seen in the case of Kissinger, the
irony of the phenomenon is inescapable. At the very moment a nation has an
opportunity to cathartically purge its past and identify and hold accountable those
few individuals responsible for its sins, it refuses to distance itself from the actors
and their atrocious acts and thus must take collective responsibility for them. 26
261. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 201-02.
262. Writing about trials of former leaders for massive human rights abuses, Rudi Teitel explained
that "what is at stake is contested national history. Ruti Teitel, From Dictatorship to Democracy: The
Role of Transitional Justice, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 272, 281 (Harold
Hongiu Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999).
263. IGNATIEFF, supra note 251 at 184-85 (addressing the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the ethnic strife which led to that conflict).
264. Id. at 184.
265. Id. at 185.
266. See supra note 89; see also supra note 109, and accompanying text. "in his savagery toward
the outside world, his heedlessness, his imperial mentality, [Kissinger] was quintessentially reflective of
very powerful strains in American life, and we must not forget that. He was not apart from the main.
And though we now single him out for responsibility, the responsibility, of course, ultimately is ours.
Morris, supra note 69.
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This argument is buttressed by the fact that Kissinger admittedly broke U.S.
law while committing his crimes, at least with regard to East Timor. American law
clearly did not sanction his actions; responsibility for the crimes committed should
therefore be pinned on Kissinger and his cohorts exclusively Although the better
course seems to be admitting the wrongdoings and placing responsibility upon the
individuals to whom it belongs, the American public has decided that it, like the
ostrich, will bury its head in the sand and refuse to believe the wrongdoings
occurred in the first place.
Other forms of denial and rationalization identified by Ignatieff include
"complex strategies of relativization. 267 These strategies occur when "one accepts
the facts but argues that the enemy was equally culpable or that the accusing party
is also to blame or that such 'excesses' are regrettable necessities in the time of
war." 268 Thus, "[t]o relativize is to have it both ways: to admit the facts while
denying full responsibility for them., 269 A species of this form of denial was
previously addressed under the auspices of the "fighting communism" defense.
270
The basic thrust of the denial is that the crimes were in some way justified, either
by the circumstances of the situation, as in self-defense, or by the geopolitical
context, e.g. the Cold War.
Although these denial mechanisms do not substantiate the conclusions they
generate, a review of the law and facts in many situations would reveal the
conclusions to be specious. This is not to say that many people actually engage in
this moment of reflection, most do not. It is this unflinching, reflexive, and
unapologetic patriotism that breathes life into the denial mechanisms and allows
the average American to foreclose the possibility that former leaders were not
pristine. The fundamental force behind this narcissistic patriotism is that "truth is
related to identity" or rather "[w]hat you believe to be true depends, in some
measure, on who you believe yourself to be.",27' At the same time, "[a]ll nations
depend on forgetting: on forging myths of unity and identity that allow society to
forget its founding crimes. 272 Thus, there is literally a systematic purge of all
adverse history from the collective consciousness which in anyway conflicts with
the society's collective self-perception. Unfortunately, this portends a rather bleak
future for the international legal system and the international human rights
movement.
267 IGNATIEFF supra note 251, at 184.
268. Id. at 185.
269. Id.
270. See supra Section I.C.3. Ignatieff explains the persuasive power of the defense: "[pleoples
who believe themselves to be victims of aggression have an understandable incapacity to believe that
they too have committed atrocities. IGNATIEFF, supra note 251, at 176. Indeed, "[mlyths of innocence
and victimhood are powerful obstacle in the way of confronting responsibility. Id
27 1. IGNATIEFF, supra note 25 1, at 174.
272. Id. at 170.
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B. The Implications of Failing to Evenhandedly Bring Transgressors of
International Law to Justice
While there is a litany of problems associated with the identified double
standard in the application of international law, three are highlighted here. And
although three discrete problems are identified, it will become clear that the issues
spill over onto each other and defy tidy compartmentalization.
I Unsatisfied Expectations and Promotion of Instability
The first set of problems associated with the failure to dispense justice
evenhandedly is its effects on the fulfillment of traditional notions of justice.
Author T.M. Scanlon asserts that fairness and retributivist notions of justice are
closely conjoined.273 Fairness, in fact, "may seem to presuppose retributivism
insofar as the idea of fairness appealed to is that punishment should go equally to
those who are equally deserving of it."' 274 Thus, the fundamental concepts ofjustice
and punishment are undermined by unequal application of the law.
Closely related to this concept is the idea that trials and hearings "[reinforce]
individual dignity rights." 275 The failure to prosecute criminals must therefore
necessarily undermine victims' individual dignity Individuals who witnessed their
families massacred deserve the opportunity to air their grievances and to have them
adjudicated by an impartial and competent tribunal. Denial of this right subverts
the logic of any system of justice, threatening its very existence.
A logical consequence of this failure to do justice is the infusion of instability
into the nation-state system. "Where the world shirks its responsibility to judge
crimes against humanity and where lawful punishments for irreparable wrongs are
not available, a lawless response is a possible or even probable consequence.,
276
Essentially, systematic disparate application of international law fosters unrest for
understandable reasons. Those who are wronged expect the perpetrator to be held
responsible and to be punished; this expectation is what the international system of
human rights law and the numerous conventions on the subject promise. When the
promise is broken, vigilante justice is the only avenue left. As professor Aryeh
Neier observes, "[jiustice provides closure; its absence not only leaves wounds
open, but its very denial rubs salt in them. 277 Moreover, "peace without justice is a
recipe for further conflict" '278 it produces a smoldering tinderbox of emotions that
awaits an appropriate moment to exact its own version ofjustice. While individual
denials ofjustice may produce individual responses, it is an inescapable conclusion
273. T.M. Scanlon, Punishment and the Rule of Lam, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 257, 262 (Harold Honglu Koh & Ronald C. Syle eds., 1999).
274. Id. (emphasis in original).
275. Ruti Teitel. From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Role of Transitional Justice, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTs 272, 280 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye
eds., 1999).
276. NEIER, supra note 1, at 213.
277. Id. This observation is made with reservations on Neier s part. See id. at 213-14.
278. Id. at 213.
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that repeated failures to enforce international human rights law sends the message
that the entire system of international law is nothing but an empty promise and an
unattainable ideal.
2. The Breakdown of the International System of Law
While critics of the conclusion drawn above might argue it is overdrawn-
that it suffers from Chicken Little syndrome-the conclusion seems
unavoidable. 279 First, one of the basic principles of law is the "observance of some
minimal evenhandedness. '280 Second, an international legal system by definition
requires international participation, but repeated failures of the system to fulfill its
promise deter active and meaningful participation. The system then becomes
stagnant and open to further abuse by powerful states, resembling the Hobbesian
state of nature: the international legal order is imposed by sheer force of power.28
As Dr. Jaime Malamud Goti well concludes, "[w]hat negatively hurts the rule of
law is the discrete prosecution of just one segment of the world's state criminals,
however vicious, when disregard for other equally vicious abusers is grounded in
reasons as alien to our notion of retributive justice as the disparity of power in
international relations.
282
Moreover, the failure to punish the most notorious violators of international
law has equally devastating effects; it "vitiates the authority of law itself. '28 3 In
this vein, professor Diane Orentlicher argues that "[t]he fulcrum of the case for
criminal punishment is that it is the most effective insurance against future
repression.,, 28 Echoing this sentiment, professor Aryeh Neier observes that "when
the community of nations shies away from responsibility for bringing to justice the
authors of crimes against humanity, it subverts the rule of law.",28 5 Of course not
every case of justice denied threatens to topple the system, nor does even a single
279. It is necessary to clarify the discussion at this point. This Article is not addressing a
Realpolitik view of the international legal system in which international law is enforced by "a few
powerful or hegemonic states. Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An
Argument for De-Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 213 (1998). Instead, this
Section addresses, for lack of a better term, a "pure" notion of the international legal system in which
states collectively create and enforce an international system of justice. The justification for this
narrowed conception of the international legal system is the fact that a system that encourages
"individual states to unilaterally sanction weaker ones outside the international framework harm[s] the
human rights project. Id., see also infra Section III.B.2-111.B.3.
280. Goti, supra note 252, at 3.
28 1. See wa Mutua, supra note 279, at 213.
282. Goti, supra note 252, at 3. Commentator Nicole Barrett argues that "political and military
muscle are not sufficient grounds to ignore legal and historical realities. Barrett, supra note 254, at
476.
283. Orentlicher, supra note 87, at 2542.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. NEIER. supra note 1, at 213. Author Emesto Garz6n Valdds clarifies, "[w]hen people see that
criminals go unpunished, this does anything but strengthen the population s internal point of view
toward, or 'dispositional subjection to, the norms of the system. Ernesto Garz6n Vaidds, Dictatorship
and Punishment: A Reply to Scanlon and Teitel, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
291, 295 (Harold Honglu Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999) (internal citation omitted).
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outrageous case, but every case does chip away at the system's ability to deter
future abuses 86 The problem creates a tradeoff: the more the iternational legal
system allows, the less potential human rights abusers are deterred. In other words,
"the stability of the international system [of law] can only be enhanced by the
increased enforcement of international norms.
287
3. Use of International Law as a Tool of Oppression by Powerful Nations
Perhaps the most egregious implication of the double standard in international
law application is the potential for powerful nations to manipulate the law for their
own purposes.2 8 Professor Makau wa Mutua argues that "[t]he current status quo
in which powerful states exploit the international vacuum of enforcement left by
impotent [international] bodies is unacceptable., 289 The objection is that the
current system "gives a handful of powerful states yet one more weapon to use
against poor peoples and their states." 29 When "the prosecution of government
officials from weaker states can be used to politically manipulate and control
weaker nations, international law acts to "perpetuate inequality between states.' '29i
If international law is nothing but an empty shell by which powerful countries
further their domination of the less powerful, rather than the international legal
system being merely impotent, it is being used as a tool of oppression.
This prospect is hard to swallow, but if true, presents a damning indictment of
international criminal and human rights law. It also calls into question all
prosecutions under these laws, including those at Nuremberg. It renders all
"justice" heretofore achieved in the field of human rights law utterly suspect, and
opens it to charges of "victors' justice.
More widely, "use [of] human rights as a pretext for achieving other foreign
policy objectives" may very well stain the entire human rights project. 92 When
"Western states employ the logic of human rights in foreign policy to advance
other goals, such as opening up markets, the human rights project risks becoming
yet another tool for powerful countries to dominate the weaker.293 This prospect
has led professor Michael Ignatieff to compare today's "aid workers, reporters,
lawyers for war crimes tribunals, [and] human rights observers" to yesterday's
"diplomats, missionaries, and commanders of imperial hill stations." 294 Although it
is an unfortunate comparison, it appears to be an accurate one.
286. "Whereas one could claim that justice is served every time human rights abuser is convicted,
it is no less true that the rule of law is dubiously compatible with extremely sporadic and selective
enforcement. Goti, supra note 252, at 3.
287 Seyedin-Noor, supra note 253, at 92 (though Seyedin-Noor disagrees with what he terms
Orentlicher's "absolutist" approach to international law enforcement).
288. See, e.g., PARENTI, supra note 45, at 1-5.
289. wa Mutua, supra note 279, at 251.
290. Id.
291. White, supra note 31, at 224.
292. wa Mutua, supra note 279, at 250.
293. Id.
294. IGNATIEFF, supra note 25 1, at 5.
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Thus, the inequitable application of international law represents a failure of
the highest magnitude. It not only implies a breakdown of the international legal
system itself, but it also reveals the abuse of the law by powerful nations who
exploit it to perpetuate and benefit from power differentials that exist in the nation-
state system, and it portends unyielding international strife. While these
conclusions represent extremes, they are asymptotes that international law and the
nation-state system appear to be approaching.
SECTION IV- CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to serve as a counter-narrative to the ubiquitous
innocence myth that pervades domestic public opinion about U.S. foreign policy
and policy-makers. Whether or not the evidence (and the evidence that could be
uncovered) is sufficient to prosecute Henry Kissinger for his deeds with respect to
East Timor is clearly a question open to debate. And this reluctant admission- that
the question is open to debate- is the crux of the purpose of this Article.
If the proposition that there is an arguable basis for holding Henry Kissinger
legally responsible for his actions in East Timor is acceptable, the overwhelming
uniformity of the innocence myth is disturbed. The question remains whether the
general public, that large segment of the polity that is exclusively informed by
network television news, will find such a proposition palatable. The question is
pressing because it resolves the broader problem of whether the double standard in
public opinion that currently plagues the international system of law is intractable.
If it is, there appear to be several less-than-pleasant implications, first and foremost
being the slow destruction of the international legal order. As that order is slowly
and increasingly flouted and disrespected by an ever-growing number of countries
and leaders, the benefits engendered by that order will begin to dissipate. Among
the list of terribles is greater instability as aggrieved nations and peoples resort to
vigilante justice (a large proportion of which is now popularly dubbed "terrorism")
to salve the wounds the international community has refused to recognize.
Additionally, because the international system of law increasingly appears to have
been co-opted by a few powerful nation-states, it is in danger of becoming
cynically manipulated as a tool of oppression, merely another weapon in the
neocolonialist arsenal.
With the dawn of the ICC,295 the international community faces a clear
crossroads. One path is that of real international participation in, and deference to,
the newly created court by fostering a genuine belief that the court will succeed in
dispensing justice without regard to nationality and other such irrelevant factors.
The alternative is the further erosion of the international system of law and the
grim prognostication described above. With the United States working tirelessly to
exempt itself and its citizens from the ICC's jurisdiction,9 the hopes are already
slim the court will achieve much. Nevertheless, not all hopes are lost. With the
establishment of the new court, the international community sans the U.S. has the
295. See supra note 2, and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 4, and accompanying text.
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opportunity to establish a system of international justice acceptable to a majority of
the world community If the court is successful in this endeavor, U.S. leaders will
face greater pressure to join as the U.S. increasingly looks out of step with the rest
of the world. However, if such an event does transpire, the crucial issue would be
whether U.S. domestic public opinion would ever countenance the trial of an
American soldier, much less a leader. The answer to this hypothetical touches at
the very nerve center of the American self-perception and is arguably
determinative of the future of the international legal system.

